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The End of an Era: A Review of the Changing Law
of Spousal Burglary
INTRODUCTION

On June 1, 1999, James C. Jones, Jr. forced his way into the
home that he and his estranged wife, Margaret "Maggie" Jones,
formerly shared and brutally stabbed her more than twenty times
with a kitchen knife that he had brought with him.' The couple's
ten-year-old daughter, Stephanie, and seven-year-old son, Brandon,
tried in vain to stop him.2 He then dragged his wife by her hair to
the door leading to the basement, threw her down the steps and
continued to stab her until she died from multiple massive
wounds. 3 When the police arrived in response to a frantic 911 call
placed by Stephanie, they found the little girl at the bottom of the
basement stairs futilely trying to revive her mother by providing
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. 4 After he murdered his wife, James
Jones fled the house through an upstairs window, but he was
apprehended shortly thereafter by police officers. 5 He was
subsequently charged with two counts of aggravated murder with
specification in violation of Section 2903.01(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code,6 one count of aggravated burglary in violation of Section
2911.11(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, 7 and one count of
1. Mark Law, Jury Spares Life in Mingo Murder, HERALD-STAR, March 22, 2000, at 1A
2. Law, supra note 1.
3. Law, supra note 1.
4. Prosecution's Opening Statement, State v. Jones, No. 99-CR-120 (final transcript of
proceedings not available at the time of publication).
5. Id.
6. Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.01 (B) is found in Title XXIX, Crimes - Procedure,
Chapter 2903, Homicide and Assault and reads: "No person shall purposely cause the death
of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy while committing or
attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to
commit, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery,
aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape." Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Anderson
2000).
7. Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.11(A)(2) is found in Title XXIX, Crimes Procedure, Chapter 2911, Robbery, Burglary, Trespass and Safecracking and reads:
structure or in a separately secured structure or separately occupied portion of an
occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice of the offender is
present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or
separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, if any of the
following apply-
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violation of a protection order or consent agreement under Section
8
2919.27(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code.
The Jones's marriage had been fraught with domestic violence
that eventually led Maggie Jones to seek assistance from a local
women's, shelter and to seek help from the courts in the form of a
civil protection order to prohibit her husband from returning to the
home or from harassing her in any manner.9 She eventually filed for
divorce.10 Subsequently, James Jones moved out of the house and
began living with his -parents; Maggie remained in the marital home
with the couple's two children. The couple was legally married at
the time of the murder, and title to the marital home resided jointly
12
in James and Maggie Jones.
The prosecutor sought the death penalty for James Jones for the
murder of his wife and the aggravating circumstances that included
(2)

The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or about the
offender's person or under the offender's control.
Onlo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.11(A)(2) (Anderson 2000).
8. Criminal Appearance and Execution Docket, State v. Jones, No. 99-CR-120
(unreported case from the Common Pleas Court of Jefferson County, Ohio). Ohio Revised
Code Section 2919.27(A)(1) is found in Title XXIX, Crimes - Procedure, Chapter 2919,
Offenses Against the Family and reads: "No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any
of the following: (1) A protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to
section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code ....
" Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.27(A)(1)
(Anderson 2000).
9. Memorandum Contra to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3, Jones (No. 99-CR-120).
The civil protection order engendered considerable debate during the pre-trial hearings.
James Jones claimed he was unaware the order was still in effect. The prosecutor argued
that Jones acknowledged during an earlier hearing that he understood the order to still be in
effect and that, as a result, Section 3103.04 of the Ohio Revised Code [prohibiting one
spouse from excluding the other from his/her dwelling house in absence of a court order]
did not preclude a charge of aggravated burglary. Although the court ultimately ruled that
the civil protection order was in effect at the time of the murder and that the aggravated
burglary charge could stand, the trial judge expressed his concern regarding the disparity
between a plain reading of Section 3103.04 and the Ohio Supreme Court rulings discussed
infra. Order Overruling Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Jones (No. 99-CR-120). The trial
judge remarked:
The State makes additional arguments that are not necessarily convincing to this
Court but are nonetheless rendered moot by this Court's findings with respect to the
CPO. For example, the State cites State v. Lilly (citation omitted) and State v. O'Neal
(citation omitted) for the proposition that a spouse may lose all rights of joint
possession under a joint deed and his right of entry under R.C. 3103.04 simply by
being absent while the other party is not absent ....
[This contention is] rendered
moot by the Court's finding with respect to the CPO and this Court expressly leaves
[that issue] undecided.
Order Overruling Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Jones (No. 99-CR-120).
10. Law, supra note 1.
11. Transcript of Proceedings for February 11, 2000, at 66-67, Jones (No. 99-CR-120).
12. Id. at 22.
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aggravated burglary and prior calculation and design.1 3 On March 8,
2000, a jury convicted Jones of aggravated murder with
specifications that he attempted to commit aggravated burglary,
was the principal offender in the attempt, and that the murder was
committed with prior calculation and design.' 4 The jury sentenced
5
James Jones to life in prison without the possibility of parole.'
Oddly enough, it is the aggravated burglary charge that sparked the
6
writing of this article.'
Since 1919,17 Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.04 ("Section
3103.04") has provided that "neither [husband nor wife] can be
excluded from the other's dwelling, except upon a decree or order
of injunction, made by a court of competent jurisdiction."18 Several
Ohio courts have interpreted the statute to mean that it is legally
impossible for one spouse to be convicted of criminal trespass and/
or burglary of the other spouse's residence.' 9 However, perhaps in
response to the growing public concern about domestic violence
such as that in the Jones case described at the outset of this
article, two recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions, State v. Lilly and
State v. O'Neal, have reversed this line of thinking by holding that
Section 3103.04 is inapplicable in criminal cases.20 These cases
significantly alter Ohio precedent with respect to criminal,
domestic relations, and property law.
Section I of this comment will review the history of Ohio Revised
Code Section 3103.04; Section II will address the role of the
13. Criminal Appearance and Execution Docket at 1, Jones (No. 99-CR-120).
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 21.
16. The writer was granted permission by the trial judge to attend the pre-trial hearing
at which the aggravated burglary charge was addressed. Extensive discussions with the trial
judge, and to a lesser extent, with both the prosecuting and defense attorneys, followed and
an engaging debate emerged about the state of the law as it pertained to spousal burglary.
The idea for this comment emerged from those sessions. The writer wishes to sincerely
thank the Honorable Judge Joseph J. Bruzzese, Jr., for his unfailing support and assistance
with this comment. Additional thanks are due to Assistant Prosecutor, Costa D. Mastros, and
defense attorney, Samuel A. Pate, for offering copies of their memoranda and insight into
their positions on the issue.
17. When the legislature originally enacted Section 3103.04 in 1887, it contained a
blanket prohibition against the exclusion of one spouse from the dwelling of the other
spouse. In 1919, an amendment was added to permit exclusion of a spouse from the other's
dwelling if a court of competent jurisdiction issued an order directing the same. See Slansky
v. Slansky, 293 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
18. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.04 (Anderson 2000).
19. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 619 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) and State v.
Herder, 415 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
20. State v. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio 1999) and Ohio v. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio
2000).
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common law in making it legally impossible for a spouse to be
charged with the burglary of the other spouse's dwelling; and
Section III will discuss the change in the law that has resulted from
the dramatic increase in spousal violence. Section IV will analyze
the two recent Ohio Supreme Court cases that address spousal
burglary; Section V will undertake an exhaustive review of the
manner in which other states have treated the issue; and Section VI
will suggest a statutory amendment to Ohio Revised Code Section
3103.04.
.

OHIO

REVISED CODE SECTION

3103.04

INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY OF

THE OTHER.

Section 3103.04 is titled "Interest in the property of the other."
The full text of this section of the statute reads:
Neither husband nor wife has any interest in the property of
the other, except as mentioned in section 3103.03 of the
Revised Code, the right to dower, and the right to remain in
the mansion house after the death of either. Neither can be
excluded from the other's dwelling, except upon a decree or
order of injunction made by a court of competent
21
jurisdiction.
The statute was enacted in 1887 as part of Ohio's Married
Women's Act.22 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate
District, in Slansky v. Slansky,23 described the Act as follows:
As the Nineteenth Century precursor of today's women's
liberation movement, this Act was part of a national campaign
to sweep away the common law web of limitations and
disabilities which had entangled a married woman's rights to
own and dispose of property, to make binding contracts, and
to sue and be sued in an individual capacity. 24
Married Women's Acts were enacted in every state to remove the
21. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.04 (Anderson 2000).
22. Slansky v. Slansky, 293 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
23. Slansky, 293 N.E.2d at 304. In this case, a wife brought an action in forcible entry
and detainer to expel her husband from a home they once shared and to which she held
legal title. The parties were separated for four years and the husband remained in the
marital home until the time of the action. The court ruled that although "municipal courts
have to determine cases in forcible detainer, they are without jurisdiction to determine
domestic relations cases and may not determine that one or the other [spouse] may be
excluded from the marital home pursuant to [Ohio Revised Code] § 3103.04." Id. at 310.
24. Id. at 304.
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common law barriers that essentially gave all of a woman's rights
and interests to her husband upon marriage. 25 However, Ohio's
legislature added a limitation to its Act that no other state did at
the time; it specifically limited the statute by attaching a proviso
prohibiting either spouse from excluding the other from his/her
dwelling. 26 According to the Slansky court, the model for this "no
ousting" provision originated in a proposed civil code for New
York.27 Although the New York Legislature failed to enact the
25. The following excerpt describes the effect of such acts:
The effect of the Married Women's Property Acts was to abrogate the husband's
common law dominance over the marital estate and to place the wife on a level of
equality with him as regards the exercise of ownership over the whole estate. The
tenancy was and still is predicated upon the legal unity of the husband and wife, but
the Acts converted it into a unity of equals and not of unequals as at common
law ....
No longer could the husband convey, lease, mortgage or otherwise
encumber the property without her consent. The Acts confirmed her right to the use
and enjoyment of the whole estate, and all the privileges that ownership of property
confers, including the right to convey the property in its entirety, jointly with her
husband, during the marriage relation.
Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977), reprinted in Jesse Dukeminier and James E.
Krier, Property 366 (4th ed. 1998).
26. Although the addition of a "no ousting" clause was unique to Ohio's statute, it has
not been and in some cases is still not, unusual for courts to rule that Married Women's Acts
do not enable a woman to bring suit against her husband for a variety of torts and crimes.
For example, in Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (Mich. 1872), the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that the statutory rights afforded to women under such acts do not supersede common
law notions of marital unity. Under such a theory, the court ruled that a husband could not
be convicted of arson for burning his wife's home. Justice Cooley noted:
As regards her individual property, the law has done little more than to give legal
rights and remedies to the wife, where before, by settlement or contract, she might
have established corresponding equitable rights and remedies, and the unity of man
and woman in the marriage relation is no more broken up by giving her a statutory
ownership and control of property, than it would have been before the statute, by
such family settlement as should give her the like ownership and control. At the
common law, the power of independent action and judgment was in the husband
alone; now it is in her also, for many purposes; but the authority in her to own and
convey property, and to sue and be sued, is no more inconsistent with the marital
unity, than the corresponding authority in him.
Snyder, 26 Mich. at 109.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in 1912 that the Ohio Married Women's Act
did not change the common law that "neither a husband nor wife could be prosecuted for
larceny of the goods of the other." State v. Phillips, 97 N.E. 976 (Ohio 1912). The Ohio court
relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Thompson v. Thompson,
218 U.S. 611 (1910), in which the Court ruled that the Married Women's Act of the District of
Columbia did not abrogate the common law rule that prevented a woman from recovering
damages from her husband for assault and battery on her person. Phillips, 97 N.E. at 977.
27. Slansky, 293 N.E.2d at 305. The proposed code stated that 'neither husband nor
wife has any interest in the property of the other, but neither can be excluded from the
other's dwelling." Id. (quoting Field's Draft, N.Y Civil Code Section 78 (1865)).
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proposed code,2 8 the Slansky court theorized that it was possible
that the Ohio legislature was persuaded that a prohibition against
spousal exclusion was necessary in light of two New York cases
wherein wives were permitted to eject their husbands from the
marital home on the basis that the home was owned by the wife
alone. 29 The court commented unfavorably on the potential for
Married Women's Acts to undermine marital relations and family
harmony by noting:
[I]t may be argued that a price was paid for vindicating the
wife's legal interest in the marital dwelling. For the family
home represents more than a bundle of property rights and
privileges which the owner is entitled to assert against the rest
of the world. Beyond its more primitive function of sheltering
the husband and wife from the physical elements, it ideally
provides the requisite sanctuary in which a marriage
relationship can take root and grow. It has been said that in
marriage a husband and wife acquire a personal as well as a
legal right to each other's conjugal society. The marital home
offers a place wherein spouses may enjoy each other's society
as they meet their obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and
support. Where a spouse is denied access to the matrimonial
. . . , these
home, as was the result in the [New York] cases
30
rights and obligations are invariably disturbed.
As the next section will illustrate, many Ohio courts adopted the
rationale offered in Slansky, which was a civil case, when deciding
criminal matters involving a spouse charged with burglarizing the
marital home or the other spouse's residence. This is, in many
respects, illogical. If one spouse is charged with criminal trespass
or burglary, it is unlikely - particularly in light of the fact that
many of these charges are coupled with violent acts of assault,
rape and murder - that the "requisite sanctuary" referred to by the
should dismiss any
Slansky court exists. Consequently, a court
31
reluctance to intrude on familial harmony.
28. Id. The provision was, however, adopted by California in 1872 as part of its Civil
Code. Id.
29. Id. at 306.
30. Id (citations and footnotes omitted).
31. Yet, American case law is replete with this notion of keeping the state out of
private family matters. See, for example, Phillips, 97 N.E. at 977, wherein the court upheld
the common law doctrine prohibiting one spouse from being charged with larceny of the
other spouse's goods. Justice Davis, writing for the majority, remarked:
Moreover, the unity of husband and wife, as recognized in the common law, is
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THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SPOUSAL CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND/OR

BURGLARY

A review of Ohio decisions surrounding the interpretation of
Section 3103.04 reveals only one certainty - the law is not clear.
The failure of the legislature to delineate whether the statute
applies to both civil and criminal matters has made the courts
uncertain regarding how to handle disputes ranging from simple
trespass to brutal murders. Lacking sufficient guidance from the
statute, judges have been tailoring the law to suit individual facts.
This ad hoc tailoring has resulted in significant differences in the
rulings.
For some time, Ohio courts seemed content to take the statute at
its words; that is to say that because Section 3103.04 states that
neither spouse could exclude the other from his/her dwelling, the
matter was resolved. It was legally impossible for one spouse to
trespass in the other's dwelling. In 1979, in State v. Herder, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Tenth Appellate District
considered the case of an estranged husband who entered a home
owned jointly by him and his wife to remove a television. 32 The
couple was living apart and in the process of obtaining a divorce. 3
The wife attempted to prevent her husband from entering the
residence and alleged that he assaulted her while forcing his way
into the home.m A jury issued an acquittal on an assault charge, but
found the husband guilty of trespass.3 5 The appellate court reversed
the conviction for trespass and ruled that "[i]n light of the clear
policy expression set forth in [Section] 3103.04, one spouse cannot
36
be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other."
founded not merely on a community of goods, but upon the recognized obligation of
both to the family and to society. The unit of society is not the individual but the
family; and whatever tends to undermine the family, by the irrepealable laws of nature
will crumble and destroy the foundations of society and the state. So that the peace
and sanctity of the home and family are the ultimate reason for the common law nile.
We do not think that we can safely hold by mere inference, that the legislature has
taken such a long step in the direction of destructive legislation.
Id. at 977-78.
32. State v. Herder, 415 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
33. Herder, 415 N.E.2d at 1001.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1002.
36. Id. at 1004. Interestingly, the trial court never mentioned Section 3103.04. Instead, it
relied on State v. Winbush, 337 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), in which the Court of
Appeals of Ohio for the Tenth Appellate District affirmed the conviction of a defendant for
the aggravated assault, aggravated burglary and voluntary manslaughter of his estranged wife
but took exception to the notion of allowing a mere trespass action to lie against a spouse.
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Two additional issues surrounding the Herder case are important
because they demonstrate judicial attempts to fashion a law that
seems to "fit" a particular case but that, as a result, create
discrepancies that make later interpretation of the statute difficult
and uncertain. First, in Herder, the husband was under a previous
order to vacate the residence once divorce proceedings
commenced.37 Ostensibly, this order could have been introduced at
the trial level by the prosecution to show that Section 3103.04 was
inapplicable in light of such an order and that charges of trespass
should stand. However, the order was never introduced as
evidence.38 Notably, the appellate court did not rest on the fact that
the order was never introduced at trial, and was, therefore, waived
on appeal as a reason for not considering the order's potential
effect. Instead, the court went further and offered:
[A]n order to vacate is an order requiring one spouse to
maintain a separate residence and is not necessarily an order
excluding him from the other's dwelling, depending on the
language of the order itself. In any event, the proper means to
enforce a court order of that nature is by contempt
proceedings in that court and not by a criminal trespass
proceeding.3 9
Second, the court made clear that although one spouse could not
"be criminally liable for trespass in the dwelling of the other ...
this does not mean that a spouse may not be liable for criminal
acts other than trespass in connection with the gaining of entry to
his spouse's dwelling."40 Even though the court singled out assault
as an example of a crime for which the husband could be charged,
it seemed to be explaining how one spouse could bring criminal
charges against another for activities related to or occurring after a
41
trespass.
Therein, the court stated:
Although a husband has a possessory interest in the abode of his spouse and,
therefore, may not be found guilty of simple trespass where no violence is involved
because of his right to be there, he may not use violence to enforce his possessory
interest. In other words, one spouse may not use violence to enter the abode of the
other. Winbush, 337 N.E.2d at 641.
37. Herder, 415 N.E.2d at 1003.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1004.
40. Id.
41. Id. Indeed, the court distinguished simple trespass from more violent crimes by
distinguishing this case from State v. Winbush, 337 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)
(discussed supra). In the last substantive paragraph of the decision, the court notes:
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The Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Fourth Appellate District
viewed the matter in a completely different light. In State v.
Middleton, the court heard the appeal of a husband convicted of
burglary with a physical harm specification and domestic violence
against his wife in her home. 42 While the trial judge noted that the
placement of Section 3103.04 (in the Domestic Relations section of
the Ohio Revised Code) and the surrounding statutory subject
matter (dealing with property rights of husbands and wives) leads
to the conclusion that Section 3103.04 does not affect criminal
liabilities, such reasoning did not survive on appeal."
The appellate court reversed the conviction and utilized two
time-honored approaches to statutory interpretation - first, that a
court will not re-write an otherwise clear statute, and second, that
criminal statutes must be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused." The court stated:
We note [Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04 unequivocally
states that neither spouse can "be excluded from the other's
dwelling" except upon court order. The statute does not limit
itself to civil matters. We may not "restrict, constrict, qualify,
narrow, enlarge, or abridge" the clear meaning of a statute to
suit the particular facts of a case at bar. It is our duty to give
effect to the words used in a statute, and not to insert words
into the statute. We again note that at the time of the offense
in the instant case appellant's spouse had not obtained a court
order restricting appellant from entering her dwelling. When
any doubt exists concerning the interpretation of a criminal
statute, the statute must be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. [Ohio Revised Code Section] 2901.04(A) provides:
"(A) Sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or
penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and
liberally construed in favor of the accused." Although [Ohio
This court held in Winbush that a husband could be found guilty of other offenses
involving violence, such as aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and voluntary
manslaughter where, by the use of violence, he enters his spouse's dwelling armed
with a shotgun for the express purpose of shooting her alleged paramour, which he
accomplishes. Most importantly, however, this court in Winbush expressly stated that,
even under those circumstances, the husband could not be found guilty of simple
trespass with respect to his wife's dwelling, which is the charge herein involved.
Accordingly, the trial court should have sustained the motion for acquittal.
Id.
42.
43.
44.

619 N.E.2d 1113 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
Middleton, 619 N.E.2d at 1115.
Id. at 1117.
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Revised Code Section] 3103.04 defines a privilege rather than
45
an offense, we believe the same reasoning should apply.
Paradoxically, although Herder purported to leave room for
burglary charges when spousal violence, as opposed to simple
trespass, was a factor, the Middleton court relied on Herder,
notwithstanding the fact that the case before it involved just such a
violent altercation between spouses. The Middelton court accepted
the defense argument that because trespass is an element of
burglary and because the Herder court held that the Section
3103.04 "ban against exclusion" prevents a finding of criminal
trespass against one's spouse, a spouse who cannot be convicted of
trespass also cannot be convicted of burglary.46 While this was an
extension of the scope of Section 3103.04 that was clearly not
intended by the Herder court, the Middelton court considered itself
free to adopt such a construction because the statute simply does
not state whether it applies to civil actions, criminal actions, or
both.
Other Ohio courts, however, have felt compelled to carve out
exceptions to Section 3103.04 when spousal violence is a factor. As
will be seen in the next section, these decisions have led to
conflicting judicial interpretations as to the appropriateness of
Section 3103.04 in the criminal arena.

III. THE SPOUSAL VIOLENCE EFFECT
In State v. Herrin, the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Ninth
Appellate District considered the appeal of an estranged husband
convicted for the felonious assault and kidnapping of his wife and
the burglary of the home owned by both parties.4 7 Willie Herrin and
his wife were living apart and in the process of divorcing; his wife
was living in the couple's home. 48 On April 20, 1981, Herrin
returned to the home and, upon finding the locks changed,
demanded that his wife allow him in the house. 49 When she
refused, he used a shotgun to gain access through a side door.50 As
his wife tried to escape, he forced her into his truck at gunpoint
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1116.
453 N.E.2d 1104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
Herrin, 453 N.E.2d at 1105.
Id.
Id.
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and threatened to kill her.5' He eventually returned her to the home
after she said that she would "cooperate" and that they could "get
back together."5 2 He was apprehended and arrested shortly after the
incident and was subsequently convicted.5
On appeal, Herrin claimed that, because he was the "legal owner
of an undivided one-half interest of the real estate," the burglary
charge should have been dismissed.54 In affirming the burglary
conviction, the court of appeals focused solely on the crime of
burglary and the meaning of trespass as defined in the Ohio
Revised Code, without ever mentioning Section 3103.04.5 Under
Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.12, burglary is defined as "(A) No
person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an
occupied structure . . . with purpose to commit therein any theft
offenses . . . or any felony."56 The Code, in Section 2911.21,
addresses "trespass" as follows:
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the
following:
(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another;
(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another, the use of which is lawfully restricted to certain
persons, purposes, modes, or hours, when the offender
knows he is in violation of any such restriction or is
reckless in the regard;
(3) Recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another, as to which notice against unauthorized access or
presence is given by actual communication to the
offender, or in a manner prescribed by law...;
(4) Being on the land or premises of another, negligently fail
or refuse to leave upon being notified to do so by the
57
owner or occupant, or the agent or servant of either.
In deciding the Herrin case, the appellate court was particularly
51.

Id.

52. Id..
53. Herrin, 453 N.E.2d at 1105.
54. Id. at 1106.
55. Id. The defendant was under a court order that prevented him from coming to the
home for anything other than child visitation, and, as a result, it is possible that Section
3103.04 would not have provided a defense but certainly the law was not settled at this
point.
56. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.12 (Anderson 2000).
57. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.21 (Anderson 2000).
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interested in Subsection E of Section 2911.21 which explains that
"[als used in this section, 'land or premises' includes any land,
building, structure, or place belonging to, controlled by, or in
custody of another, and any separate enclosure or room or portion
thereof."58 It is this language that gave birth to the "custody and
control" test that would later gain acceptance by the Ohio Supreme
Court. The court explained:
The record in the instant case is replete with evidence that the
house (i.e., "land or premises") was in the custody of and
controlled by defendant's wife; likewise, it was not in the
custody of, or controlled by, defendant, who was living
elsewhere at the time of the burglary. When defendant forcibly
entered the residence without his wife's permission, he
"trespassed." When he trespassed for the purpose of
committing a felony therein, he committed, at the least, a
59
burglary.
In 1995, the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the First Appellate
District considered the case of State v. O'Nealn) and attempted to
reconcile the discrepancy between the theory that criminal
trespass/burglary was impossible under Section 3103.04 [unless a
court order excluding one spouse from the residence of the other
existed] and the notion that "the use of force or violence to enforce
a possessory interest turns an authorized entrance into a
trespass."61 Carole Ann O'Neal filed a domestic violence charge and
an application for a temporary protective order after her husband,
James, assaulted her.62 Thereafter, she changed the locks on the
house to prevent her husband and his two children from returning
to the home.6 Four days later, after threatening his wife via
58.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.21(E) (Anderson 2000).

59. Herrin,453 N.E.2d at 1106. It is interesting to note that the Herrin court refers to
Herder as support for the notion that "[u]nder Ohio law an individual can trespass against
property of which he is the legal owner," when the Herder court specifically found that,
notwithstanding Section 2911.21(E), it is impossible for an individual to criminally trespass in
the dwelling of his/her spouse [presumably whether he/she is or is not the legal owner] "in
light of the clear policy expression set forth in [Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04."
Herder, 415 N.E.2d at 1004.
60.
State v. O'Neal, 658 N.E.2d 1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). The decision in this case
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in January 2000. The supreme court's treatment
of the test developed by the court of appeals will be discussed in Section IV.
61. ONeal, 658 N.E.2d at 1104.
62. Id. at 1103.
63. Id. The marital home was leased through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Only Carol O'Neal was named as the tenant, although an amendment was later
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telephone, James returned to the home, kicked in the door and
fatally shot his wife.4 Ironically, the Hamilton County Municipal
Court journalized a temporary protective order that would have
prevented James from entering the residence one day later.6
James O'Neal was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder
with death penalty and firearm specifications, one count of
attempted murder, and one count of aggravated robbery.66 The case
was appealed to the appellate court by the state67 after the trial
court granted a defense motion to dismiss "all aggravated burglary
charges and specifications on the ground that a husband cannot be
guilty of trespass in his own home, and therefore the state could
not prove an essential element of the offense."6
The appellate court was eager to address the larger picture of
spousal burglary because, although the only matter before it was
whether it was appropriate for the issue of "trespass" to be
determined at trial rather than by a motion to dismiss, the court
stated "we do not believe it would be helpful to the trial court to
address only this procedural issue." 9 The court opened its
discussion by noting, "[t]he issue of whether a person can ever be
guilty of trespassing on his or her own property is a thorny one,
70
especially in today's climate of increased domestic violence."
At the outset, the court expressed its consternation with cases
that held that the presence of violence could convert an authorized
entrance into a criminal trespass by explaining "[als appealing as
this proposition may be, it is adding an element to the offense of
burglary which is simply not in the statute."7' However, the court
made that added the names of two stepchildren. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The tragic pattern of protective orders journalized or served "a day late" is not
uncommon. In the Jones case, described in the opening of this comment, the protective
order granted to Maggie Jones was mailed to James Jones the morning after he murdered
her. Motion for Dismissal of Specifications to Counts I and IV and Dismissal of Counts II and
IIl at 2, Jones (No. 99-CR-120).
66. O'Neal, 658 N.E.2d at 1102-03.
67. Id. at 1103. The trial court proceedings were stayed, pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code Section 2945.67, pending the outcome of the appeal. Id. The state argued "that when
an abusive spouse has been charged with domestic violence and the victim spouse has
assumed sole control of their formerly joint residence, the abusive spouse commits an
aggravated burglary when he forces his way into the home with the intent to commit a
felony." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court added, "[fturther guidance on the legal issue raised by the state is
necessary to assist the trial court on remand." Id.
70. Id.
71. ONeal, 658 N.E.2d at 1104. The court referred to Ohio Revised Code Section
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was equally unwilling to rule that Section 3103.04 unilaterally
prevents one spouse from being charged with burglary of the other
spouse's residence. 72 Instead, the court drew a distinction between
criminal and civil law and held that Section 3103.04 had no
application in a criminal case.73
The court agreed with the state's argument that "burglary statutes
are designed to protect occupancy and possession, not title." 74
However, the court flatly noted that all of the cases cited by the
state as support for the idea that one spouse could be prosecuted
for the burglary of the other spouse's residence involved situations
in which it was "clear that the spouses had established separate
residences." 75 Observed the court, "[s]imply throwing a spouse out
of the house and changing the locks does not establish this."76
The court delineated a test that was to be used when one spouse
did not have a court order preventing the other from entering his/
her residence. It specifically stated:
[I]n the absence of a restraining order or an order granting
one party exclusive possession of the marital residence, the
question of whether one spouse has the sole possessory
interest in the house depends on whether the evidence shows
that both parties had made the decision to live in separate
places. Both parties must have understood that the possessory
interest of one was being relinquished, even if it was
relinquished begrudgingly or reluctantly. In the absence of
such a showing, there can be no finding of trespass and,
77
hence, no aggravated burglary.

2901.04(A), which states that criminal laws must be strictly construed against the state. Id.
72. Id. Moreover, the court went on to announce that "[nior are we prepared to state
that a de facto, as opposed to a de jure, separation of the parties gives them each permission
to barge into the residence of the other." Id.
73. Id. The court noted that Section 3103.04 "has its historical roots in Ohio's version
of the Married Women's Act" and recommended Slansky v. Slansky, 293 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1973) "[f]or an excellent historical analysis of its use in a proper context." Id.
74. Id. at 1104.
75. Id.
76. O'Neal, 658 N.E.2d at 1104. The court noted:
The only information in the record . . . is that four days before she was killed, Mrs. O'Neal
threw her husband and his two children out of the house. She had the locks changed and
was in the process of boxing up his clothes. The only information as to the defendant's
whereabouts is that he told police that on the days he was out of the house he was living on
the streets.
Id. at 1104-05.
77. Id. at 1104. The court remanded the case and instructed the trial court to permit
the state to provide its evidence that both parties made the decision to establish separate
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Before the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the ONeal case on
appeal, it heard the case of State v. Lilly.78 While the case purports
to clarify the confusion surrounding the issue of spousal burglary,
it leaves several gaps in the law that still require interpretation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO RESPONDS

The facts in State v. Lilly 79 differ from many of the cases that
center around acts of domestic violence that occur after one
spouse forces his way into the residence of the other spouse.
Harold and Jacqueline Lilly were married for approximately eight
years before they separated in 1996.80 They briefly reunited for
several months, but then Mrs. Lilly left the marital residence,
stayed briefly with her husband's sister, and eventually leased an
8
apartment in her own name where she and her son began living. 1
82
Harold Lilly began living with his mother after the separation.
Though separated, the couple continued to spend time together.
Such was the case on January 26, 1997.83 On this day, they spent
the morning and afternoon together; however, Mr. Lilly became
irate when his wife refused to spend the evening with him or to
have sexual relations with him. 4 She alleged that he slapped her
and burned her with a cigarette, and that she .had nonconsensual
sexual relations with him to "avoid further harm."85 Afterward, Mr.
Lilly drove her to two bars and, at one of them, she sought help
from a bar employee. 86 Mr. Lilly tried to block his wife's attempt to
87
solicit help but failed and then fled the bar.
Harold Lilly then returned to his wife's apartment, cut up several
residences. Id. at 1105. The court noted that "if the evidence is insufficient in this regard, the
defendant may not be convicted of the aggravated-burglary-related charges and
specifications." Id. On remand, the jury found James O'Neal guilty of two counts of
aggravated murder with two death penalty specifications related to the aggravated burglary,
guilty of three firearm specifications, and guilty of aggravated burglary. State v. O'Neal, 721
N.E.2d 73, 80 (Ohio 2000). At the penalty phase, he was sentenced to death. Id. at 80-81.
78. 717 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio 1999).
79. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322.
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id. at 323-24. The court noted, "At trial, Mrs. Lilly testified that the lease for her
apartment was in her name and the defendant did not have a key. Mrs. Lilly testified that
defendant did not contribute money for her apartment. She further testified that defendant
knew that it was her place." Id. at 324.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 324.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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pairs of her pants, stole her purse and her garage door opener, and
detached the spark plug wires in her car.8s Although he was hiding
in the apartment when the police arrived, he was undetected8 9 He
was later arrested and indicted on twelve counts of rape, two
counts of attempt to commit rape, three counts of possessing
criminal tools, one count of kidnapping, and one count of
burglary. 90 The rape and attempted rape charges were withdrawn at
trial, and the jury convicted Harold Lilly solely of burglary.91
The Montgomery County Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction on the ground that Section 3103.04 "negated the state's
proof of the element of trespass as a matter of law."92 The Supreme
Court of Ohio considered the case after granting a discretionary
appeal. 93 Justice Stratton Lundberg, writing for the majority, framed
the issue as "whether [Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04
precludes prosecution of one spouse for burglary committed in the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 323.
91. Id. at 325.
92. Id. Interestingly, the defendant never raised Section 3103.04 as a defense at trial;
however, the appellate court found that this amounted to plain error. Id. The Supreme Court
of Ohio seemed to find this interesting (and, indeed, the dissent disagreed with the use of
the plain error doctrine in this case) because it remarked in a footnote that "[slome
appellate courts, including the court in this case, have applied [Ohio Revised Code Section]
3103.04 in criminal contexts." Id. at 325 n.1. The Court cites State v. Brooks, 655 N.E.2d 418
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995), another case heard by this appellate court in Montgomery County, as
support for this remark. Id. at 325. However, a review of that case reveals that, although a
burglary conviction was the basis for the appeal, the parties were not married and the crime
occurred at the apartment of a friend of the defendant's girlfriend and, hence, Section
3103.04 did not apply. The Brooks court remarked:
With regard to possible defenses to the charged offense of burglary, the only
"privilege" relevant to the trespass element of that charged offense that we are aware
of concerns the privilege of one spouse not to be excluded from the other's dwelling,
absent a court order. Thus, one spouse cannot be held criminally liable for trespass in
the dwelling of the other spouse unless there exists a court order restricting one of
the spouses from entering the dwelling of the other. We are not aware, however, of
any similar privilege which would apply in a case such as this one where there is no
marital relationship and the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that defendant's
request for entry into [lessee's] apartment was expressly refused.
Brooks, 655 N.E.2d at 423 (citations omitted).
In response to the defendant's assertion that he had been living for a time in the
apartment and, therefore, had a privilege to be there, the court remarked that such a fact,
even if assumed to be true, did not prevent the lessee from refusing entry at any time. Id.
Furthermore, the court noted "that to the extent trespass is an invasion of the possessory
interest in property, it is possible for a person to commit a trespass even with respect to
property which he owns in whole or in part." Id. (citation omitted).
93. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 325.
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583

residence of the other spouse." 94 The answer immediately followed
as the court announced, "we hold that a spouse may be criminally
liable for trespass and/or burglary in the dwelling of the other
spouse who is exercising custody or control over that dwelling.
[Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04 is inapplicable in criminal
95
cases."
The court began its analysis by discussing the history of the
common law disabilities imposed upon married women and the
statute, the Ohio's Married Women's Act, that was designed to give
married women the same property rights as those enjoyed by
non-married women. 96 The court then began its review of Section
3103.04, enacted twenty-six years after the Married Women's Act,
and "the reason behind the spousal exclusion prohibition."97 The
court relied heavily on the history provided by the Court of
Appeals of Ohio for the Eight Appellate District in Slansky v.
Slansky98 and remarked:
The Slansky court concluded that the purpose of [Ohio
Revised Code Section] 3103.04 was to "limit their [i.e., the
spouses'] respective rights so that neither spouse can effect a
separation, revengeful or otherwise, simply because one has
full title to the marital dwelling house. Thus, one can
reasonably conclude that the basis behind the spousal
exclusion is the fear that one spouse would eject the other
from the marital dwelling. 99
As did the Middleton trial court, the Supreme Court of Ohio
noted the placement of Section 3103.04 in the domestic relations
chapter and observed that the 1887 Act as a whole "primarily
addressed property rights as they relate to domestic relations." 1°°
The court also reviewed statutes in seven other jurisdictions that it
found similar to Section 3103.04 and remarked that "none . .
applies this civil statute in criminal contexts." 101 With that, the court
concluded:
[Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04 was intended to address
94. Id. at 325.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 326.
98. 293 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
99. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 326 (citation omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. The court reviewed similar statutes enacted in California, Guam, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Carolina. Id.
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property ownership rights of married persons, matters of a
civil nature. Privileges of a husband and wife with respect to
the property of the other were not meant to be enforced
criminally and do not affect criminal liabilities. Because we
find that the General Assembly never intended for [Ohio
Revised Code Section] 3103.04 to apply in criminal contexts,
we must turn to the Criminal Code to address this issue. 1°2
The court then shifted its focus from what it had just declared a
"civil" law to criminal law and undertook an analysis of the crimes
of burglary and criminal trespass.1°3 Acknowledging that "the law of
102. Id. at 326-27.
103. Id. at 327. Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.12 defines "Burglary" as follows:
(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: (1)
Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied
portion of an occupied structure, when another person other than an accomplice of
the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately
secured or separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense;
(2) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately
occupied portion of an occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary
habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the
offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the
habitation any criminal offense;
(3) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately
occupied portion of an occupied structure, with purpose to commit in the
structure or separately secured or separately occupied portion of the structure
any criminal offense;
(4) Trespass in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person
other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present.
(B) As used in this section, "occupied structure" has the same meaning as in section
2909.01 of the Revised Code.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of burglary. A violation of division (A)(1) or
(2) of this section is a felony of the second degree. A violation of division (A)(3)
of this section is a felony of the third degree. A violation of division (A)(4) of this
section is a felony of the fourth degree.
OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.12 (Anderson 2000).

Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.21 defines "criminal trespass" as follows:
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following:
(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another,
(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, the use of which is
lawfully restricted to certain persons, purposes, modes, or hours, when the
offender knows he is in violation of any such restriction or is reckless in that
regard;
(3) Recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises of another, as to which notice
against unauthorized access or presence is given by actual communication to the
offender, or in a manner prescribed by law, or by posting in a manner reasonably
calculated to come to the attention of potential intruders, or by fencing or other
enclosure manifestly designed to restrict access;
(4) Being on the land or premises of another, negligently fail or refuse to leave upon
being notified to do so by the owner or occupant, or the agent or servant of
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burglary evolved out of a desire to protect the habitation" and "to
protect the dweller," the court held "that custody and control,
rather than legal title is dispositive."1°4 The court directly answered
the question of whether a spouse could be charged for burglarizing
a home to which he/she holds legal title by stating, "in Ohio, one
can commit a trespass and burglary against property of which one
is the legal owner if another has control or custody of that
105
property."
The court also took what seems to be an extra step by noting
that, assuming arguendo, that the defendant believed he had a right
to his wife's property, "civil, peaceful avenues of redress exist to
enforce the rights of a person who believes he or she has been
wrongfully excluded from certain property."1°6 The court had little
trouble finding sufficient evidence to support Harold Lilly's
conviction for burglary and reversed the decision of the court of
appeals. 107
either.
(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that the land or premises involved
was owned, controlled, or in custody of a public agency.
(C) It is no defense to a charge under this section that the offender was authorized to
enter or remain on the land or premises involved, when such authorization was
secured by deception.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor of the
fourth degree.
(E) As used in this section, "land or premises" includes any land, building, structure,
or place belonging to, controlled by, or in custody of another, and any separate
enclosure or room, or portion thereof.
Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.21 (Anderson 2000).
104. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 327. As further support for this theory, the court noted that
Section 2911.21(E) of the Ohio Revised Code did not require that legal title be established
before a criminal trespass violation could occur, but instead, required only that the land or
premises be "controlled by, or in the custody of another." Id.
105. Id. It is worth noting that the court did not have to stretch this far under the facts
involved. In the Lilly case, Jacqueline Lilly leased a separate apartment in her own name.
Her estranged husband did not have a key and did not contribute to the financing of the
apartment. He also kept no belongings at his wife's residence. Id.
106. Id. Again, the court relied on the criminal trespass statute, Section 2911.21(C), and
stated "there is no privilege to use force, stealth, or deception to regain possession." Id.
This is further than the court needed to go because, in this case, the defendant went to his
wife's residence to destroy her clothing, disable her car, and steal her purse. He never
asserted that he was attempting to "regain possession" of property that he considered to be
his or that he was entitled to his wife's personal property. Id. at 328.
107. Id. Justices Cook and Moyer concurred in the judgment of the court but disagreed
with the appellate court's use of the "plain error" doctrine. Justice Cook offered that "[elven
if [Ohio Revised Code Section] 3103.04 would have obviated the element of trespass so as to
aid Lilly's defense, the failure to raise the issue decides the case." Id. By way of explanation,
Justice Moyer offered the following:
Appellate courts may only invoke the plain error doctrine "with the utmost caution,
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The issue of spousal burglary came before the Supreme Court of
Ohio again in January 2000, in the State v. O'Neal'0 8 case wherein
the common thread of domestic violence reappeared in horrifying
fashion. The supreme court appeared bent on providing a much
more detailed account of the verbally and physically abusive
relationship between James Derrick O'Neal and Carol O'Neal than
did the appellate court five years earlier. The court noted that Carol
applied for a temporary protection order on December 7, 1993,
after she reported to police that her husband "struck her in the
face numerous times, choked her, shoved her to the ground, and
kicked her."1°9 Carol also told the police that her husband had
"recently moved out of the house." 110
Notwithstanding this fact, she remained terrified that her
husband would return to the home."' One of her co-workers
testified that she feared for her life, that while she was at work she
was "nervous, shaky, and drained," and that "whenever the
telephone rang at work, '[Carol] would be shaking, scared, thinking
it was going to be [James] on the phone.' "112 On the day of the
murder, James did telephone Carol at work and stated, "Bitch, it
3
ain't over yet.""
And it was not over. James O'Neal returned to the home he
formerly shared with his wife and shattered the glass in the front
door of the home." 4 When his wife heard this, she:
ran upstairs screaming, and she and her youngest three
children retreated into a bedroom. She directed the children
into a closet and she stood pushing on the bedroom door
trying to keep [James] from entering. Two of Carol's children,
under exceptional circumstances." Plain error is "obvious error prejudicial to a
defendant, neither objected to nor affirmatively waived by him, which involves a
matter of great public interest having substantial adverse impact on the integrity of
and the public's confidence in judicial proceedings. The error must be obvious on the
records, palpable, and fundamental, and in addition it must occur in exceptional
circumstances where the appellate court acts in the public interest because the error
affects 'fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "
Id. (citations omitted). Admittedly, it is hard to accept that this defendant's conviction for
burglary, under the facts as outlined, had "an adverse impact on the integrity of and the
public's confidence in judicial proceedings."
108. 721 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio 2000).
109. ONeal, 721 N.E.2d at 78.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 78.
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who were looking out of the closet, testified that [James] fired
a shot at the bedroom door and that Carol fell to the floor
behind the bedroom door. [He] then entered the bedroom and,
115
while standing over Carol, fired two or three shots at her.
When he was questioned by the police, James O'Neal admitted
that he knew his wife had contacted the police after he assaulted
her on December 7, that "he had not been living at the Plainville
Road home," that he " 'moved out' when Carol demanded that he
and his sons leave the home," that he had since been "living on the
streets," that he "entered the residence by kicking the front door
glass," and that he "chased Carol up the stairs."11 6 Nonetheless, his
appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio contended "that the holding
in O'Neal P1 7 is in direct conflict with [Ohio Revised Code Section]
3103.04, which, according to appellant, provided him with a
privilege, absent a court order, to enter the residence leased by his
spouse."l""
The Supreme Court of Ohio spent little time on this contention
and reiterated its less than three month old holding in State v.
20
Lilly'1 9 that Section 3103.04 was inapplicable in criminal cases.
The court also rejected O'Neal's contention that the appellate
court's ruling was an " 'unnecessary act of judicial legislation'
redefining criminal trespass." 2 ' Working through the same analysis
of the law of burglary and the definition of trespass as it did in
Lilly, the court concluded that:
115. Id. James O'Neal then found Carol's fourteen year old son and, according to the
boy, "pointed the gun at his neck and pulled the trigger at least twice." The gun, however,
did not fire and James O'Neal fled the house. Id.
116. Id. at 79. The supreme court noted that James O'Neal also "confessed that he
forced his way into the bedroom and as Carol lay 'huddled' on the floor behind the bedroom
door 'crying and screaming' he shot her 'two or three times.' Appellant also stated that he
'wanted to teach her a lesson,' and that he did not care if she died." Id.
117. Again, the holding by the appellate court was as follows:
[Iln the absence of a restraining order or an order granting one party exclusive
possession of the marital residence, the question of whether one spouse has the sole
possessory interest in the house depends on whether the evidence shows that both
parties had made the decision to live in separate places. Both parties must have
understood that the possessory interest of one was being relinquished, even if it was
relinquished begrudgingly or reluctantly. In the absence of such a showing, there can
be no finding of trespass, and hence, no aggravated burglary.
O'Neal, 658 N.E.2d at 1104.
118, O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 81 (footnote omitted).
119. 717 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio 1999).
120. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 81.
121. Id. at 81-82.
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[A]ny person can indeed commit a trespass against property
that belongs to, is controlled by, or is in the custody of
someone else. Therefore, a spouse can be convicted of
trespass and aggravated burglary in the dwelling of the other
spouse who owns, has custody of, or control over the property
22
where the crime has occurred.
The court turned away contentions that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that James O'Neal trespassed against the
property where Carol resided. 23 Pointing out that Carol "was in
sole custody and control over the home," that she was the "lessee
under the lease agreement," "that [James'] name was not on the
lease," that James moved out after he assaulted his wife on
December 7, that she "filed a motion for a temporary protection
order," that he "admitted to the police that, prior to the day of the
murder, he had moved out and no longer lived in the home," and
that he "shattered the glass in the front door, entered the
residence, and killed Carol," the court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to show that James did not live at the residence
24
and that it was in "Carol's sole custody and/or control."
Accordingly, the element of trespass in the aggravated burglary
25
charge was met and James O'Neal's conviction affirmed.
The O'Neal decision reflects the current state of the law in Ohio.
Before commenting on the potential shortcomings of the law and
offering suggestions to strengthen it as well as to remove lingering
questions, it is important to review the manner in which other
states have handled similar issues.
V.

OTHER STATES' TREATMENT OF SPOUSAL BURGLARY

To gain a full understanding of spousal burglary, it is helpful to
review the manner in which other states, via statute and/or case
law, have treated the issue. Although Ohio appears to have been
the only state with the "no ousting" provision when it enacted its
amendment to the Married Women's Act, several states have since
added similar provisions. 26 In other states, the issue is still decided
122. Id. at 82.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 82.
126. See, e.g., CAL FAm. CODE §§ 752 and 753 (West 2000) (providing that although
neither spouse has any interest in the separate property of the other [unless otherwise
provided by statute], neither spouse can be excluded from the other's dwelling); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 40-2-201 (2000) ("Neither husband nor wife has any interest in the property of the

2001

Review of Spousal Burglary

purely on a common law basis. What follows is a state-by-state
analysis.
Alabama
In 1990, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reviewed the
case of Leroy White, who was sentenced to death by electrocution
for the capital burglary-murder of his wife, Ruby White.12 One of
the twenty issues on appeal was "whether one spouse may
burglarize the residence of the estranged spouse" and this was an
issue of first impression in Alabama. 2 ' Leroy and Ruby White
separated in the autumn of 1988 after repeated marital difficulties,
129
and Ruby moved into a shelter for victims of domestic violence.
Thereafter, Ruby filed for divorce and during a pendente lite
hearing, the parties agreed that Leroy would move out of the
marital residence and that Ruby and her two children would
resume living there.130 The day following the hearing, Leroy
removed all of his belongings from the home.' 3' Ruby, her children,
and her sister commenced living in the home and Ruby changed
132
the locks to prevent her husband from returning to the residence.
However, Leroy White did return to the home twice on October
17, 1988, and a horrific sequence of events followed.13 Upon
arriving the first time, he nearly ran over his seventeen month old
daughter and then proceeded to pick up the child and drive away
with her.'3 He returned shortly thereafter armed with both a
other, except as mentioned in 40-2-102, but neither can be excluded from the other's
dwelling unless enjoined by a court."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-3 (Michie 2000) ("Neither
husband nor wife has any interest in the property of the other, but neither can be excluded
from the other's dwelling."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-04 (2000) ("Except as otherwise
provided... neither the husband nor the wife has any interest in the property of the other,
but neither can be excluded from the other's dwelling."); OiUA STAT. tit. 43, § 203 (2000)
("Except as mentioned in the preceding section neither husband nor wife has any interest in
the separate property of the other, but neither can be excluded from the other's dwelling.").
127. White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
128. White, 587 So.2d at 1222.
129. Id. The record indicated that during one of the domestic disputes between the
parties, the defendant shot his wife in the leg. Id.
130. Id. The court noted that "the residence.., was owned solely by Ruby White prior
to her marriage." Id.
131. Id. at 1224.
132. Id. at 1222.
133. White, 587 So.2d at 1222-23.
134. Id. at 1223. The evidence showed that prior to this first trip, Leroy White
purchased a shotgun at one pawnshop and ammunition for the gun at a separate pawnshop.
Id. at 1222-23.
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shotgun and a pistol. 35 Upon seeing this, Ruby and her sister fled
to the home and attempted to lock themselves inside. 36 Ruby sent
her oldest child to hide under a bed; her youngest child remained
in Leroy's car. 137 The following description of events is taken from
the trial judge's "finding of facts summarizing the crime":
The defendant then came up to the front door of 2217 Evans
Drive and finding it locked, shot the glass out of the storm
door and shot the lock off the wooden front door. He then
kicked the door open, entered the house and began to scuffle
with Ruby and her sister, Stella. As Stella tried to flee the
house, the defendant ran out on the front porch and shot four
times. Stella fell in the yard (having been wounded in her right
arm and right leg).
The defendant then went back into the house and confronted
Ruby who was begging and pleading ° for her life. After a brief
confrontation, Ruby ran out into the front yard at which time
the defendant told her to stop or he would blow her legs off.
She stopped and the defendant confronted her with the
shotgun. Ruby grabbed the barrel of the shotgun and
continued to plead for her life. Her daughter Latonia was in
the defendant's car and her son Brian was in the house.
Finally, the defendant shoved Ruby away from the gun and
fired at her at point blank range with the double-aught
buckshot. The blast tore the flesh from her right arm as she
tried to shield herself and the pellets penetrated her chest and
abdomen. Ruby fell to the ground moaning but she was not
dead. Testimony revealed that the defendant then went back
into the house and called for Brian to come out of his hiding
place. When Brian came out, the defendant told him to tell his
daddy that "...
when I get out of this, I'm going to kill him,
too."
The defendant then went back outside, walked up to where
Ruby lay on the ground moaning and said, "Bitch, you ain't
dead yet." He then went to his car, re-loaded the shotgun,
picked up his 17-month old daughter and walked back over to
where Ruby lay on the ground. As he placed the muzzle of the
shotgun to her neck, he said, "Bitch, this is the last thing you
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.
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will see." He then smiled and pulled the trigger.
The blast tore a whole in Ruby's neck where the gunshot
entered and blew off the back side of her head where it
exited.
At this time, the police arrived and the defendant surrendered
without incident.1- 8
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that "burglary,
like trespass, is an offense against the possession, and hence the
test for the purpose of determining in whom the ownership of the
premises should be laid ... is not the title, but the occupancy or
possession at the time the offense was committed." 139 The court
observed that the facts in this case - that the parties were
separated at the time of the offense, that they were in the process
of divorcing, that the defendant orally agreed (at a hearing at
which he was represented by an attorney) to move out of the
house, that he did actually move out, that he took "all of his
belongings with him," and that the defendant's wife changed the
locks immediately thereafter - were sufficient to find him guilty of
140
burglary.
Because this was a case of first impression, the court relied
heavily on the law of other jurisdictions. 14 1 Ultimately, it sided with
138. White, 587 So.2d at 1223. A full understanding of the living arrangements of the
White's and the extraordinarily violent circumstances surrounding the death of Ruby White is
necessary to appreciate the absurdity of the appellant's defense that he did not "knowingly
and unlawfully [enter] his wife's residence with the intent to commit the crime of murder"
and that "he was licensed or privileged to enter the marital residence." Id. It is also helpful
in understanding how completely preposterous an argument asserting a right to consortium
is in cases involving domestic violence.
139. Id. The court also remarked that, under Alabama law, "A person 'enters or
remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed, invited or privileged to do
so." Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-7-1(4) (1975)).
140. Id. at 1224.
141. Id. For example, the court reviewed decisions from the states of Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington that dealt with the issue
of spousal burglary. The court also reviewed the law as stated in 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 38
(1980) that explains that:
Some authorities broadly state that a man cannot burglarize his wife's home, and it is
considered that the burglary statute is not designed to protect against entries by
persons occupying a marital or immediate familial relationship with the legal
possessor of property. So, it is held that in the absence of a legal separation
agreement, or restraining order, or court decree limiting or ending the consortium
rights of the parties, each spouse has a legal right to be with the other spouse on
premises possessed by either or both spouses so long as the marriage exists, and
entry onto such premises by.either spouse cannot be a burglary, although a court
order will negate any rights to enter the premises. While "the offense [of burglary] is
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the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Cladd v. State that a
"husband, who is physically but not legally separated from his wife,
can be guilty of burglary when he enters premises, possessed only
by the wife and in which he has no ownership or possessory
interest, without his wife's consent and with intent to commit an
offense therein." 42 The court rejected "the position that there is any
absolute right on the part of one spouse to be with the other
against the other's wishes, giving a right to break into the home of
the other with the intent to commit a crime." 43 After reviewing the
nineteen additional grounds for appeal, the court affirmed the
defendant's conviction and death sentence. 144
California
California's Family Code Section 753, which is essentially
identical to Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.04, provides that
"neither spouse may be excluded from the other's dwelling." 45 In
1990, the Court of Appeals of California for the Fifth Appellate
District considered whether such a statute affected the conviction
of an estranged husband for the burglary of a cabin owned by his
in-laws but utilized by his wife.1 46 Gary and Gina Davenport married
in 1984 and in May of 1985 Gina went to live in her parents'
not committed by one who breaks and enters his own dwelling or other building," "it
has, however, been held that the mere existence of the marriage relationship does not
preclude the one spouse from committing burglary against the other spouse."
Id. (citing 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 38 (1990 Supp.) (footnotes omitted)).
142. Id. (quoting Cladd v. State, 398 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1981)). This case is discussed in
detail later in this section.
143. White, 587 So.2d at 1225. The court noted that it was adopting the position of
courts in Florida, Ohio and Washington and remarked, "The common thread running through
these cases is that the mere existence of the marriage relationship does not put a spouse's
separate property beyond the protection of the law and subject to the depredation of the
other spouse." Id. at 1226.
144. Id. at 1236. Following its review of the propriety of a death sentence the court
remarked, "As was the trial court, this Court is struck by the merciless, brutal, and
cold-blooded depravity of the defendant." Id.
145. CAL FhAu CODE § 753 (West 2000). The statutory predecessor to Section 753 was
Section 5102(a) of the California Civil Code, which provided that "neither husband nor wife
has any interest in the separate property of the other, but neither can be excluded from the
other's dwelling . . ." The section was repealed in 1994, but the rule was continued in
Sections 752-54 of the California Family Code. Section 752 provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by statute, neither husband nor wife has any interest in the separate property of
the other." CAL FhM. CODE § 752 (West 2000). Section 753 provides: "Notwithstanding Section
752 . . . neither spouse may be excluded from the other's dwelling." CAL FAM. CODE § 753
(West 2000).
146. People v. Davenport, 268 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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cabin.'4 7 In July of 1985, Gary joined her and they lived there
intermittently with Gina's parents until early 1986.14 At that point,
the Davenports separated, Gary moved out and returned his keys to
the cabin to his mother-in-law; however, items of his personal
belongings remained in the cabin. 49 On September 5, 1986, he and
an accomplice drove separately to the cabin, smashed windows on
two floors of the cabin in order to gain entry, and stole items
belonging to Gina and her mother.' 5° They were arrested after
151
stealing a nearby truck, and Gary was charged with burglary.
Gary Davenport argued that he possessed "an unconditional right
to enter [his in-law's] cabin under [current California Family Code
Section 753]" and claimed that the statute was "triggered" by three
facts:
(1) His marriage to Gina;
(2) Gina being a resident of the cabin; and
(3) The absence of any court proceeding to terminate their
marriage or otherwise limit their respective rights and
obligations to one another and, specifically, to occupancy
of the cabin. He reasoned that the statutory prohibition
against exclusion is equivalent to an unconditional right of
52
entry.'
The court rejected these contentions, noting that there was
"substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that [Davenport]
did not have the right to enter the cabin on September 5, 1986, or
that any such right was conditional."'1' The appellate court
147.

Davenport, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 502.

148.

Id.

149. Id.
150. Id. These activities followed a crime spree that occurred two days earlier wherein
the defendant and his accomplice ransacked and stole items from the office of a
maintenance yard located next to the cabin in question. One of the vehicles utilized was a
flatbed truck belonging to Gina Davenport. Id.
151. Id. at 503.
152. Davenport, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
153. Id. at 505. The court substantiated this conclusion by offering the following:
Appellant and Gina had been separated for months prior to the burglary. Gina
continued to live at the cabin, and appellant lived elsewhere. He relinquished his keys
at [his mother-in-law's] request and had already taken possession of some of his
personal property. Gina instructed him not to take his remaining personal property
unless she was present. She boxed and stored his items upstairs so he wouldn't have
any reason to set foot downstairs, and told him so. Though no dissolution or legal
separation proceeding had been filed when the burglary occurred, serious difficulties
in the marital relationship existed and appellant no longer had a possessory right to
enter the [in-law's] cabin. Gina did not have an ownership interest in the cabin. At

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:567

concluded, "appellant did not have an ownership or tenancy
interest entitling him to enter the cabin without permission. His
right of entry under [the statute] was qualified to a lawful
purpose . . . [the statute] does not endow one with the right to
burglarize the dwelling of his or her estranged spouse." 1 4
Colorado
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Colorado considered the case of
People v. Johnson wherein it reviewed the conviction of a husband
convicted of second degree burglary and first degree criminal
trespass for his unlawful entry into his estranged wife's
apartment. 1' Eric and Tina Johnson were married for slightly more
than one year before Tina moved out of the marital home and
entered into a lease arrangement for a separate apartment. 156 At no
time did Eric Johnson share this apartment, and his name did not
157
appear on the lease.
Shortly thereafter, Tina Johnson filed a petition to dissolve her
marriage. 1 Approximately eight months after Tina Johnson leased
the apartment, her husband appeared and entered her residence
twice on the same day. 59 During the first encounter, he verbally
assaulted his wife and physically assaulted her friend; during the
6
second encounter, he "kicked in the door" of her residence.
Eleven days later, the dissolution of the couple's marriage became
final.161
Eric Johnson argued that, because he and his wife were still
legally married at the time of the offenses, he had a privilege to
enter the residence and, as a result, he could not be convicted of
trespass or burglary. 62 He relied upon a Colorado statute that
declares that property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage, but prior to a legal separation, is presumed to be marital
best she had a tenancy at will.
Id.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
unable to
159.
Id.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
906 P.2d 122 (Colo. 1995).
Johnson, 906 P.2d at 123.
Id.
Id. Eric Johnson was not in the State of Colorado at the time; the state was
make personal service on him. As a result, service was made by publication. Id.
Id. At no time did Mrs. Johnson request a restraining order against her husband.
Id.
Johnson, 906 P.2d at 124.
Id.
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property. 1 He reasoned that, because his wife leased the
apartment prior to a final dissolution of their marriage, the
apartment was considered marital property in which he held an

interest.1
The trial court granted Eric Johnson's motion to dismiss all
charges on the ground that he could not be convicted of burglary
or trespass because he and his wife were still married at the time
of the incidents, there was no restraining order against him at the
time and, as a result, his entry was not unlawful.'6 The Supreme
Court of Colorado reversed the decision and ruled that, although
the defendant "may have had some right to assert an economic
interest in the lease when the Johnson's property was divided in
their dissolution," he had no "possessory right or a license or
privilege to make an unauthorized entry" into his wife's separate
apartment. 66 Noting that the gravamen of a burglary charge
involves "the possessory rights of the parties, and not their
ownership rights," the court held that "Mr. Johnson's purported
ownership interest in [his wife's] lease does not equate with a
possessory interest that shields him from charges of trespass and
burglary." 67 As a result, the court ordered the burglary and criminal
trespass charges reinstated. 16
F/orida
A very thorough review of the treatment of spousal burglary can
be found in the courts of Florida. This is a result of two cases,
163. Id. (referring to Cow. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(3) (1987)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 123.
166. Johnson, 906 P.2d at 124, 126.
167. Id. at 125. As in the White case in Alabama, this was an issue of first impression
in Colorado. Again, as did the Alabama court, the Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the
treatment of spousal burglary in other jurisdictions, including Alabama, Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington. After
concluding that "[a] majority of courts agree that the mere existence of the marriage
relationship does not put a spouse's separate property beyond the. protection of the law," the
court noted that only Ohio had "reached a different result." Id. at 125-26. The court
described Section 3103.04 of the Ohio Revised Code as granting "a privilege of entry by
spouses into the dwelling of the other spouse absent a restraining order" and remarked that
"[aibsent a similar Colorado statute granting a privilege, there is no comparable support for
the trial court's finding that Mr. Johnson had a privilege of entry." Id. at 126. Interestingly,
the court remarked that "even under the Ohio statute, a spouse 'may not use violence to
enforce his possessory interest. In other words, one spouse may not use violence to enter
the abode of the other.' " Id. (quoting State v. Winbush, 337 N.E.2d 639, 641 (Ohio Ct. App.
1975)).
168. Johnson, 906 P.2d at 126.
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Vazquez v. State and Cladd v. State, that resulted in the Supreme
Court of Florida overruling the Court of Appeals of Florida for the
Third District.1 69 The rationale of each court, as well as the dissents
by several justices of the supreme court, provide an excellent
overview of the complexity of this issue and the opposite ends of
the judicial spectrum embraced by courts when deciding whether
one spouse can be charged with burglarizing the other spouse's
residence.
In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Florida for the Third District
reviewed the case of Francisco Vazquez, who was convicted for
burglary and battery of his estranged wife. 70 At the time of the
offense, the couple had been physically separated for over a year,
but neither party had taken steps to legally end the marriage and
neither had asked the courts for a restraining order. 71 Mr. Vazquez
returned to the couple's apartment in the "early morning hours" of
December 7, 1975, knocked on the door, and "demanded that his
172
wife let him in."
She refused, alleging that she feared he would
harm her, and called the police as well as neighbors to assist her. 73
Eventually, her husband "broke the apartment door down, entered
the apartment and physically struck his wife in the face with his
174
fists causing certain injuries."
At a bench trial, Francisco Vazquez was convicted of burglary
and battery and sentenced to one year in the county jail. 7 In
appealing his burglary conviction, 76 he argued that he had a legal
right to be with his wife that, as a matter of law, precluded him
from being charged with burglary. 77 The appellate court agreed,
169. Vazquez v. State, 350 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Cladd v. State, 398
So.2d 442 (Fla. 1981).
170. Vazquez, 350 So.2d at 1095.
171. Id. at 1096. Mr. Vazquez formerly shared the apartment with his wife, and the bills,
although paid by Mrs. Vazquez, were in his name. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Subsequently, neighbors arrived and prevented Mr. Vazquez from further
harming his wife. Id.
175. Vazquez, 350 So.2d at 1096.
176. Id. The defendant also appealed his battery conviction, but at "oral argument...
he quite properly abandoned this position since it ... [was] clear from the record that the
evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the battery conviction." Id.
177. Id. At trial, the motion for judgment of acquittal (pertaining to the burglary
charge) was made at the close of the state's case. What is striking about this is that, because
the defendant did not renew the motion at the close of all the evidence in the case, the
appellate court was required to review only evidence presented by the State and to resolve
"all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the state." Id. at 1095 (citation
omitted). Ultimately, this court - reviewing only the most damaging portions of the evidence;
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relying on the portion of the Florida burglary statute that provides
an exception to the illegality of unconsensual entries for a person
who is "licensed, invited or otherwise has a legal right to be on the
premises." i 8 The court reasoned:
In the instant case, the wife had a possessory right in the
apartment which the defendant entered without the wife's
consent with intent to physically abuse the wife. Ordinarily,
this would constitute a burglary if the parties had been
unmarried. But the parties were married and this fact makes a
crucial difference because the defendant for the purposes of
the burglary statute had a legal right to be on the premises
179
with his wife at the time of the entry.
What was most disturbing about the appellate court's rationale in
this case arises from the following quote:
One of the essential characteristics of the marriage
relationship is consortium. Consortium means much more than
sexual relations and means, also, affection, solace, comfort,
companionship,
conjugal life, fellowship,
society and
assistance so necessary to a successful marriage. Consortium
necessarily implies that each spouse has a legal right to be
with the other which relationship neither one can unilaterally
18 0

terminate.

Such a rationale is far more illogical and dangerous than merely
relying on a statute, such as Section 3103.04 of the Ohio Revised
Code, to uphold a defendant's "right to burglarize" his spouse's
residence. In the latter, it was rational (if not desirable) to read the
that is, that which was presented by the state - agreed that, as a matter of law, the
defendant could not be charged with burglary despite the violent nature of the entry and the
long absence from the apartment. Id.
178. Id. at 1096. Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes provides as follows:
(1) "Burglary" means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the
intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to
the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of
years not exceeding life imprisonment . . . if, in the course of conunitting the
offense, the offender.
(a) Makes an assault upon any person.
(b) Is armed, or arms himself within such structure, with explosives or a dangerous
weapon.
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 1975).
179. Vazquez, 350 So.2d at 1097.
180. Id.
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statute as it is written and conclude that statutorily neither spouse
could exclude the other from his/her dwelling in the absence of a
court order. In cases like Vazquez, however, the courts return to
archaic and irrational arguments that some twisted notion such as
"consortium" or "family harmony" provide one spouse (usually the
husband) with the legal right to enter the other's residence by any
means necessary. Quite simply, it makes no sense to argue that a
public policy supporting the sanctity of the family or one spouse's
right to "affection," "solace," "comfort," "companionship," or
"fellowship" makes it permissible for one spouse to violently enter
the residence of the other in order to commit some other (usually
violent) illegal act.""1
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Florida visited this issue in
1981 when it heard the case of Cladd v. State. 82 The facts in Cladd
were similar to those in Vazquez, except that Mr. Cladd at no time
resided in his wife's separately leased apartment.'1, The couple had
been separated for nearly six months when the defendant arrived
at his wife's apartment, gained entry using a crowbar, assaulted her
and attempted to "throw her over the second floor stair railing."""4
He failed but returned the next morning and again attempted to
185
gain entry; however, he fled when police arrived.
Relying on the Third District's opinion in Vazquez, the defendant
moved to dismiss charges of burglary and attempted burglary and
argued that, because "the victim was his wife, he was licensed or
invited to enter her apartment as a matter of law."86 The trial court
agreed; however, the State appealed and the Court of Appeals of
181. Ironically, the court stated, "Traditionally, the criminal law has intervened in
[domestic disputes] at the point of threatened or actual violence against either spouse, or
when one spouse steals the separate property of the other spouse." Id. In the case before
the court, Mrs. Vazquez testified that she did not open the door because she feared her
husband would harm her. Id. at 1096. Regrettably, she was correct; her husband sought entry
to the residence for the sole purpose of physically assaulting her. Id. at 1097. Such facts
demand that one ask "what, if not this, constitutes the point of threatened or actual
violence?" The court continued:
We cannot conceive that the legislature intended to apply the burglary statute with its
harsh criminal penalties to domestic disputes within the immediate family unit over
the right to be on certain premises. Such disputes have been and should continue to
be treated as purely civil matters to which the burglary statute is inapplicable.
Id.The court saw "no valid reason for departing from this sound and well-established
precedent." Id.
182. 398 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1981).
183. Cladd, 398 So.2d at 443.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Florida for the Second District reversed the decision. 18 7 The
appellate court reasoned that, although "each spouse has the legal
right to the other's company," it did "not believe that this includes
the right to enter the other's apartment without permission with the
intent to assault the other."1t8
The court of appeals' decision was appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court. While noting at the outset that "the factual
situation [at bar] is narrow," 8 9 the Florida Supreme Court rejected
"the defendant's contention that the marriage relationship and the
right of consortium deriving therefrom preclude the State from ever
establishing the nonconsensual entry requisite to the crime of
burglary" and "disapprove[d] the Third District's contrary ruling in
Vazquez." 90 The court concluded, "[since burglary is an invasion of
the possessory property rights of another, where premises are in
the sole possession of the wife, the husband can be guilty of
burglary if he makes a nonconsensual entry into her premises with
intent to commit an offense."' 91 Thus, the court reinstated the
187. Id.
188. State v. Cladd, 382 So.2d 840, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
189. C/add, 398 So.2d at 443.
190. Id. at 444. The court seemed convinced that the Third District realized that it
created too broad of a rule in the Vazquez case (i.e., that, as a matter of law, a spouse could
not be guilty of burglary because of a legal right to be with the other spouse) because of its
contradictory holding less than one year later in Wilson v. State, 359 So.2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). The supreme court, comparing the appellate court's ruling in Vazquez with its
later ruling in Wilson, remarked:
Later, in Wilson v. State ... the Third District addressed the issue of whether entry
into a father-in-law's home, where defendant's wife was temporarily residing, with
intent to assault her constituted burglary, Distinguishing Vazquez on the basis that, in
Wilson, the premises were possessed by the wife's father, the Third District affirmed
defendant's burglary conviction and said that the husband's legal right to be with his
wife did not establish consent where the wife was living in premises which were not
solely possessed by her. The right of consortium alone was not sufficient to give the
husband a right of entry into these premises. Yet, the legal right of consortium was
the basis upon which the Third District premised its determination of implied consent
in Vazquez.
Id.
191. Ciadd, 398 So.2d at 444. The court rationalized that this type of burglary analysis
was consistent with its earlier ruling that one spouse could be charged with larceny of the
other spouse's separate property. Id. Drawing from language in State v. Herndon, 27 So.2d
833 (Fla. 1949), a case wherein the court reached such a result, the court reiterated:
In a society like ours, where the wife owns and holds property in her own right,
where she can direct the use of her personal property as she pleases, where she can
engage in business and pursue a career, it would be contrary to every principle of
reason to hold that a husband could ad ib appropriate her property. If the
common-law rule was of force, the husband could collect his wife's pay check, he
could direct its use, he could appropriate her separate property and direct the course
of her career or business if she has one. We think it has not only been abrogated by
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defendant's convictions for burglary and aggravated burglary. 92
It is important to recognize that the majority view of the
Supreme Court of Florida was confined to the "narrow" facts of the
case. 93 The fiction of the marital harmony and right of consortium
argument was very much alive in two strongly worded dissents. For
example, Justice Boyd found the facts in Vazquez and Cladd
virtually indistinguishable and exalted the right of consortium by
remarking that "[u]nder long-established principles of
Anglo-American law, one of the essential incidents of the marital
state is the right of spouses to the company and comfort of one
another."194 He suggested:
Consortium is so basic as an incident of marriage that it
should not be undermined except by a clear legislative
statement of the public policy of this state. The legislature
should reconcile the matter of consortium rights with the
elements of any crime, and should do so very carefully when
dealing in the context of a crime carrying a possible sentence
of life imprisonment. 95
It boggles the mind to think that there was a shred of consortium
worth protecting in either the Vazquez or Cladd cases. In both
instances, an estranged husband used an inordinate amount of
force to gain unannounced and unwanted entry to a home
possessed solely by his wife for the singular purpose of physically
assaulting her. But for the fact that the parties were still legally
married, the defendants would have been convicted of burglary
with little, if any, difficulty. If burglary statutes are designed to
protect the dweller, to protect possession, and to protect
habitation, an individual surely is not entitled to less protection of
these interests simply because she is married to the aggressor. 96
law, it has been abrogated by custom, the very thing out of which the common law
was derived.
Id. (quoting Herndon, 27 So.2d at 835).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 443.
194. Cladd, 398 So.2d at 444.
195. Id.
196. Yet this form of discrimination still creeps into modem day opinions. Justice
England also dissented in the Cladd case and noted:
Like an anxious Pandora endeavoring to stuff the ills of the world back into her box,
the majority endeavors to confine interspousal crimes to the factual situation of this
case. As Pandora and the world sadly learned, however, once the box is opened there
is no way to contain the ephemeral evils which escape.
Id. at 445.
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The rationale provided by this dissent is so utterly disturbing that it warrants a
paragraph-by-paragraph analysis and refutation. Justice England begins by offering that, "The
majority holds today that one spouse may commit burglary against another. This new
common law doctrine has emanations which go far beyond this case. This becomes evident
when the case is viewed preliminarily from the perspective of what is not involved here." Id.
He notes:
First, this is not a prosecution for assault. Any discussion with regard to the
husband's physical abuse or intended physical abuse of his wife is extraneous to the
legal question presented. Mr. Cladd may or may not be prosecuted for his violent acts
toward his wife's person. Whether that occurs is beside the point.
Id.
It certainly is not beside the point. As repeatedly explained by courts, burglary law is
designed to protect the dweller and his/her right of habitation. The issue of violence is
obviously an element that threatens a spouse's status as a dweller and most certainly affects
his/her habitation. Aggravated burglary statutes, by their very definition, often are enacted to
heighten the punishment for burglaries comnitted while an individual is armed or when the
perpetrator has injured or threatened to injure a person in the dwelling. See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE AND AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 800 (2d ed. 1986) (describing aggravated
burglary and the manner in which legislatures classify levels of burglary in order to address
the seriousness of a particular offense); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.11 (Anderson 2000)
(delineating that an offense is elevated from "burglary" to "aggravated burglary" when "a
person other than an accomplice of the offender is present," when "the offender inflicts, or
attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm on another," or when "the offender has a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or about the offender's person or under the
offender's control.")
Justice England goes on to state:
Second, this case does not involve spouses who are divorced, legally separated, or
already in court in a pending dissolution proceeding. The husband and wife here are
married, and there is no objective, legal manifestation that their marriage or
interpersonal relations are being unwound. That they live apart, it will be seen, is
quite irrelevant to the legal issued posed.
Cladd, 398 So.2d at 445. This simply does not comport with the facts of the case. To most
reasonable people, the fact that an estranged husband arrives at his wife's apartment, enters
by breaking the lock with a crowbar, strikes his wife and attempts to throw her over a two
story railing would present an "objective, legal manifestation that their marriage or
interpersonal relations" are unwinding. That the spouses have not legally separated is, or
should be, irrelevant.
Justice England continues:
Third, this case does not entail a situation where separately-owned property,
purchased or inherited by the wife, was established as a residence apart from her
husband's. The record here only shows that Mrs. Cladd's living accommodations were
separate from her husband's. We do not know who purchased the furnishings and
fixtures, whether they came from a residence which had been occupied jointly, or
even whether the separate abode was a second or alternative home.
Id.The record does, in fact, reveal that the defendant had "no ownership or possessory
interest in his wife's apartment" and that he had never lived at the residence. Regardless of
who purchased the furnishings, it is apparent that entry via crowbar is not an appropriate
manner in which to retrieve them, and there is no evidence that Mr. Cladd's arrival at his
wife's apartment centered around anything other than an intent to harm her once inside.
The dissent continues:
When these matters are removed from the legal considerations, this case boils down
to a husband's uninvited entry onto premises which the wife occupies away from the
marital home. This situation is legally indistinguishable from other situations in which
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Indiana
The erosion of the common law rule that husbands and wives
could not commit crimes against each other's property continued in
Indiana when, in 1982, the Court of Appeals of Indiana for the First
District reversed a trial court decision to dismiss burglary charges
against a wife for the burglary of her husband's tavern.197 Bruce and
a separate residence by one or both spouses and in which one is temporarily residing,
such as a summer home, a winter ski lodge, a vacation cottage at the seashore, a
temporary, rented haven from marital incompatibility, a remote wing or separate
building on jointly occupied property (such as a studio garage in which one spouse
works alone), or even a separate bedroom in which one spouse may be seeking a
retreat in the marital home. The record of this proceeding nowhere indicates that the
wife had a separate possessory interest in the property she placed in her separate
facility. We do not know whether the six-month separation of these spouses was the
result of estrangement, a mutually agreed-upon cooling off period, a segregated
vacation plan, or some other reason. Mr. Cladd here, I submit, was simply charged
with illegal entry into a place where his wife claimed sanctuary from their common
residence. The manner of entry and the purpose for entry may prompt judicial
concerns for the wife's welfare, but the parties' motives or state of mind will prove an
unreliable touchstone for criminal prosecutions of this sort, I predict.
Id. at 445-46. Departing from the usual legal terminology for a moment, I would submit that
this is utter hogwash. Detailed legal research uncovers scant, nay any, examples of spouses
charged for burglary for attempting to gain access to the other spouse's "vacation cottage at
the seashore." In the case at hand, Mr. Cladd was represented by the Public Defender, it
appears unlikely that the court was dealing with a "segregated vacation plan." Finally, state
of mind is essential to any burglary charge (note the requirement that the defendant must
break and enter with the intent to commit an offense inside). It is no more an "unreliable
touchstone for criminal prosecution" in marital cases than it is when the parties are
unmarried.
Justice England concludes:
The effect of today's decision is to bring prosecuting attorneys into marital disputes in
a way which is unprecedented in Florida or elsewhere. I confess I am not comfortable
with the Third District's analysis of the basis for rejecting burglary prosecutions in
these situations [based upon] a right of cohabitation or consortium. Those concepts
connote marital harmony, and here we have obvious discord. I am quite comfortable,
however, with the thought that our criminal courts should not be involved, in fact or
as a threat, in domestic disputes which involve an invasion of one spouse's claim of
separateness or privacy. Personal assaults, I repeat, are different, and in those cases
perhaps different considerations should pertain.
Id. at 446. It trivializes the crime of spousal burglary to suggest that the only issue involved
is "one spouse's claim of separateness or privacy." The reason the criminal courts should be
involved is that all persons, married or unmarried, are entitled to the sanctity of their
dwellings. When spouses are living apart and one spouse commits what, under any other set
of circumstances, would constitute a burglary against the other, the criminal courts should
step in and serve the functions of deterrence and punishment.
197. State v. Dively, 431 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct App. 1982). Marion Sue Dively was also
known as Marion Sue Hembd. She moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the following
grounds:
Because, upon divorce,... the court can divide marital property, it cannot really be
known which spouse owns the property before a final decree; a wife has an
unrestricted right to enter her husband's real estate, and therefore cannot be guilty of
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Marion Hembd were separated and awaiting the final dissolution of
their marriage when Mrs. Hembd entered a tavern owned by her
husband despite being forbidden to do so.19 Once inside, she stole
$4,400.00 from a safe along with several bottles of whiskey. 1
The Indiana appellate court framed the issue as "whether there
exists in Indiana an interspousal immunity from criminal
2°°
prosecution for [burglary] merely because of the marital status."
In deciding that there was no such immunity, the court embarked
upon a discussion of the "unity doctrine" at common law, the effect
of Married Women's Acts upon that doctrine, and recent
developments under Indiana law. 20 1 The court noted that "[t]he
Supreme Court of Indiana, early on, made inroads into the unity
doctrine" when it "affirmed the conviction of a husband for arson
of his wife's property while they were living together."2 2 That case,
as well as Beasley v. State2°3 in which the supreme court held that
a husband could be convicted for larceny of his wife's goods even
while the two were living together, "had the effect of drastically
altering the unity theory and interspousal immunity for crimes
"2°4
existing at common law.
Labeling a 1972 case in which the Indiana Supreme Court struck
down interspousal immunity in tort "a more recent blow to the
unity theory," the court of appeals observed, "[t]he [supreme] court
burglary of her husband's property; the Married Women's Act was never intended to
create criminal liability between spouses; and the right of privacy precludes
prosecution of one spouse for a crime against the property of another spouse. Dively,
431 N.E.2d at 542.
198. Id. at 541.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 541-42. The "unity doctrine" holds that "the husband and wife are one
person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
whose wing, protection, and cover she performs everything." IAN F.G. BAXTER, MARITAL
PROPERTY 3

(1973)

(quoting

1

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*442). Consider the

following passage critiquing the doctrine:
The law of husband and wife thus bound the interests of spouses closely together.
Ideally the system should have worked. If men always acted wisely and fairly, the
common law rules on marital relations might have served everyone well enough. To
say that they did not is only to state the obvious. Unity of person was based upon the
perfect marriage, and therefore it inevitably created hardships in marriages that were

less than ideal.

MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA

15 (1986).
202. Dively, 431 N.E.2d at 541. The court was referring to an 1866 decision in the case
of Garret v. State, 10 N.E. 570 (Ind. 1866).
203. 38 N.E. 35 (Ind. 1894).
204. Dively, 431 N.E.2d at 542.
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faced the argument that tort actions would tend to disrupt the
peace and harmony of the marriage. Referring to the immunity
doctrine as a 'legal fiction,' the court noted that the 'persuasiveness
of the common law doctrine of unity between husband and wife
has dwindled considerably.' "205 In reinstating the burglary charges,
the court of appeals announced it was "equally unimpressed that
the criminal law should not intrude into the lives of married people
where property rights are concerned."2 6 The court concluded:
[Tihe mere fact of conjugal status does not preclude a spouse
as a matter of law from committing an offense, including
burglary, against the separate property of his or her spouse.
We do not believe that the mere existence of the marriage
relationship puts a spouse's separate property beyond the
protection of the law and subject to the depredation of the
27
other spouse.
The decisions of the Indiana courts reflect an understanding of
the archaic nature and inapplicability of the common law doctrines
of unity and interspousal immunity to many crimes between
spouses. While there is a growing trend toward this manner of
judicial interpretation, it is not uniformly adopted throughout the
country. In addition, in some jurisdictions, such as Ohio, statutes
exist that open the door to defenses related to the unity doctrine,
the idea that courts should not interfere in domestic disputes, and
arguments regarding interspousal immunity.
Kentucky
Regrettably, one reason for the frequent appeals from spousal
burglary convictions is their connection to death penalty sentences.
In many states, burglary or aggravated burglary is listed as one of
the criteria that may be considered in deciding between a sentence
20 8
of life imprisonment and the imposition of the death penalty.
205. Id. The supreme court case involved was Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794
(Ind. 1972), and in the decision, the court also remarked that current state law allowed
actions of ejectment, contract enforcement, and actions in partition between spouses. Id.
206. Id. at 543. Additionally, the court pointed out that the definitional sections of the
Indiana criminal code do not exclude spouses as victims. Id.
207. Id. The court acknowledged that circumstances such as "express or implied
permission" may prevent a charge of burglary in certain cases; however, such circumstances
were not at issue in the case. Id.
208. For example, Section 2929.04 of the Ohio Revised Code outlines the "Criteria for
imposing death or imprisonment for a capital offense" as follows:
Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or
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Such was the case in Kentucky, when, in 1985, the state supreme
court considered the appeal of David Matthews of his death
sentence for the murders of his wife and his mother-in-law, and his
appeal of his twenty year prison sentence for the first-degree
2°9
burglary of his wife's home.
Mr. Matthews and his wife, Marlene, were married for
approximately two and one-half years with the last year being
particularly volatile. 10 Marlene obtained several warrants against
her husband for harassment; when the parties separated, David
lived with his mother. 211 Five weeks before she was murdered,
Marlene sought and obtained two warrants against her husband the first charging him with sexually abusing his six-year-old
stepdaughter and the second charging him with burglarizing her
21 2
home.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 29, 1981, David Matthews slit
the side screen door to the house where his wife was living with
her daughter, broke the window, and proceeded to the bedroom
where his mother-in-law was sleeping. 21 3 He shot her at point blank
range in the head, mortally wounded her.21 4 Mr. Matthews told his
psychiatrist that he then proceeded to his wife's room, had sexual
relations with her, and, at approximately 6:00 a.m., shot her twice
and killed her.215 Among his thirty-seven assignments of error, he
contended that:
[H]e was entitled to a directed verdict on the burglary charge
because he had formerly shared occupancy of the premises.
more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment
pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:

. . . . The

offense was committed

while the offender was committing,

attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated
burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the
aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder
with prior calculation and design.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Anderson 2000).
209. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985).
210. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 417.
211. Id.
212. Id. Although the sexual abuse order was served and prohibited Matthews from
having contact with his wife, the burglary order was not served prior to the murders. Id.
213. Id. The home was rented from Mrs. Matthews's family and served, intermittently,
as the marital residence for David and Marlene Matthews.
214. Id. The victim's husband and Marlene's father, Mr. Lawrence Cruse, found her the
next morning still alive, however, she died from her wounds shortly thereafter. Id.
215. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 417. According to his psychiatrist, he shot her twice
because "he thought he had missed the first time." Id.
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His position [was] that the house was first rented as an abode
for him and his wife, that he had occupied it with her during
their marriage except for the periods when they were
estranged, and that, therefore, he had a legal right to be on the
premises, regardless of proof that on the night in question he
2 16
forcibly broke into the house against the occupant's wishes.
The Kentucky Supreme Court flatly disagreed and stated, "[w]e
reject the position that there is any absolute right on the part of
one spouse to be with the other against the other's wishes, giving a
right to break into the home of the other with the intent to commit
a crime."217 The court adopted the rationale of Florida, Ohio, and
Washington courts that "burglary is an invasion of the possessory
property right of another and extends to a spouse." 218 The court
upheld the convictions for the murders of Marlene and her mother
and for the burglary of Marlene's home, and ruled that the sentence
219
of death was appropriate.
Maryland
Maryland joined the growing number of states rejecting the
notion that the marital relationship insulates one spouse from being
charged with the burglary of the other spouse's residence when, in
220
1989, it upheld the burglary conviction of Charles Parham.
Parham and his wife, Charlene Queen, moved into a condominium
in Baltimore shortly after marrying in 1987.221 Their relationship,
even at that time, was fraught with violence and Queen warned her
husband that, if he continued to beat her, she would "put him out"
of the house. 222 The beatings continued and within several months,
216. Id. at 419.
217. Id. at 420. The court dismissed David Matthews's claims that he possessed a legal
right to be at the home by remarking that the home "was owned by the victim's brother and
rented to her, to be used as a marital abode when the parties were not separated." Id.
Further, the court stated that David Matthews "was under a court order issued in connection
with the sexual abuse charge ... to stay away from the premises." Id.
218. Id. The court specifically referred to Cladd v. State, 398 So.2d 442 (Fla- 1981);
State v. Herrin, 453 N.E.2d 1104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); and State v. Schneider, 673 P.2d 200
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983) and quoted Cladd with approval, "Where premises are in the sole
possession of the wife, the husband can be guilty of burglary if he makes a nonconsensual
entry into her premises with intent to commit an offense." Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 420.
(quoting C/add, 398 So.2d at 444).
219. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 420, 424.
220. Parham v. State, 556 A-2d 280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
221. Parham, 556 A.2d at 281.
222. Id.
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she made him leave the home. 223
On December 16, 1987, Charles Parham returned to the home,
threw a brick through the window, and hid in the home until his
wife returned.2 24 Upon her return, he attacked her, held a knife to
her throat, and demanded that she remove her clothing and "run a
hot tub of water" so that he could "cut [her] in pieces and put [her]
in water."225 He then stabbed her in the head and, later as she tried
to escape, stabbed her again in the back. 226 She was eventually
227
rescued by neighbors and taken to the hospital.
On appeal, Parham contended that there was insufficient
evidence to support his burglary conviction; specifically, he claimed
that the state failed to establish that the "breaking" element of the
burglary was into "a dwelling house of another."228 Parham argued
that:
[A]s long as he and Queen remained married, the dwelling
place is still marital property and thus, he has an absolute
right to be there. [Parham] avers that, even though they
separated on numerous occasions, the October separation was
not final since some of his clothes were still in the
condominium. Accordingly, he could not be convicted for
burglary since his breaking and entering was not the dwelling
place of another, but his own. 229
The appellate court disagreed and pointed out that "the law of
burglary was designed for the purpose of protecting the habitation"
and that "occupancy or possession, rather than ownership, is the
test."m The court noted that:
Queen was in sole possession and in the process of
purchasing the property in her own name, and . . . appellant
was living with his sister and was not on the title. [Parham]
had separated from his wife approximately six weeks prior to
the incident, having spent only a week in the ... home before
the separation. He had left very few belongings there; most of
his clothes were at other places . . . . Also indicative of
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 282.
Parham, 556 A.2d at 282.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
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appellant's lack of a possessory or occupancy interest is the
method he used to gain entry. Appellant threw a brick through
a window, unlocked it and entered with the intent to assault

his wife. This method of entry is inconsistent with any kind of
permissive entry. Moreover, his wife had "put him out" of the
home.?'
As this was a case of first impression in Maryland, the court
relied on holdings from other jurisdictions, including, Florida,
Kentucky, Virginia, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Washington,
and Ohio and observed that "other courts have held, virtually
unanimously, that the marital relationship does not preclude a
conviction for burglary."?32 The court ruled that the evidence
against Charles Parham was sufficient to affirm his burglary
conviction3m
North Carolina

In 1985, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina grappled with
the issue of whether a "marital relationship, in and of itself,
constitute[d] a complete defense to the offense of burglary in the
2
first degree" when it considered the case of State v. Cox. 3
Saunders Cox rented a house with his wife and daughter until July
1982 when he and his wife separated. 3 5 He moved out of the house
but continued to visit his daughter and provided financial support

to both his wife and his daughter.2 36 Nearly one year after Mr. Cox
231. Parham, 556 A.2d at 284 n.3.
232. Id. at 284-85. The court reviewed the cases of Cladd v. State, 398 So.2d 442 (Fla.
1981) (noting that it expressly overruled Vazquez v. State, 350 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W2d 414 (Ky. 1985); Knox v. Commonwealth, 304
S.E.2d 4 (Va. 1983); State v. Dively, 431 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Woods, 526
So.2d 443 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Cox, 326 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); and State v.
Schneider, 673 P.2d 200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). The court cited only State v. Weitzel, 168
N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) as contrary to the former holdings but noted that State v.
Herrin, 453 N.E.2d 1104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) seemed to contradict Weitzel. Parham, 556
A.2d at 284-85.
233. Parham, 556 A-2d at 284-85. The final footnote in the case observes that such a
holding comports with the section of the Maryland Code that addresses defenses to the
crime of theft. Id. The pertinent section reads, "(c) It is a defense to the offense of theft that
. . . (3) [t]he property involved was that of the defendant's spouse, unless the defendant and
the defendant's spouse were not living together as man and wife and were living in separate
abodes at the time of the alleged theft." Id. (referring to MD. ANN. CODE, § 343 (1957, 1987
Repl. Vol.).
234. 326 S.E.2d 100, 102 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
235. Cox, 326 S.E.2d at 102. The court noted that "Mrs. Cox intended the separation to
be permanent." Id.
236. Id.
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moved out of the house, he called and asked his wife if he could
come to the house, but his wife refused.2 7 When he asked if,
instead, he could speak to his daughter, his wife told him that she
was spending the night with a relative.2 3 Shortly thereafter, he
arrived at the home and demanded that she unlock the door and
allow him to come inside the residence. 239 When she refused and
called the police, he slashed the tires on the car of the man who
was inside the home with his wife, kicked in the door of the house,
and proceeded to his daughter's bedroom where he found the man
and stabbed him in the leg. 240 Upon witnessing this, Mrs. Cox shot

241
her husband but did not kill him.
At trial, a jury convicted Mr. Cox of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury and first degree burglary. 42 He was
sentenced to five years in prison for the assault and twenty-five
years in prison for the burglary. 24 Upon appeal, he argued that "the
evidence clearly shows that . . . [he] was entitled to enter his
marital domicile even though he had been separated from his
wife." 24 While conceding that the State bore the burden of proving
that Mr. Cox "wrongfully entered" the dwelling house "of another,"
the appellate court found that the following facts met that burden:

[T]he State offered evidence tending to show that Mrs. Cox
occupied the residence located at 1204 W. Fifth Street.
Defendant's wife paid the rent and utilities pursuant to her
occupation of the house. Mrs. Cox testified that defendant had
not resided in the home for more than a year prior to the
offense with which he was charged, and that she repeatedly
refused to admit him on the night in question. We think this
evidence ample to permit an inference that defendant broke
245
and entered the dwelling house of another.
The court rejected "defendant's argument that the marital
relationship between him and Mrs. Cox necessarily created in the
246
defendant a property interest in the residence of Mrs. Cox."
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cox, 326 S.E.2d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Cox, 326 S.E.2d at 103.
Id.
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Addressing the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly
excluded evidence showing that elements of his personal effects
remained in the home, the court declared that "neither the absence
of a separation agreement nor the presence of his clothing and
tools in the house is relevant to defendant's right to enter the home
occupied exclusively by Mrs. Cox and the couple's daughter."247
Finally, the court rejected Mr. Cox's assertions that the trial court
should have instructed the jury that self-defense was a possible
defense when the "person assaulted is without fault and on his own
premises.'248
Texas
In 1982, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas had little
difficulty affirnming the conviction of Frank Stanley for the burglary
of an apartment inhabited by his wife and her ten-year-old son.249
The couple was married for slightly more than one year before
Carolyn Stanley filed for divorce and requested a temporary
restraining order against her husband. 25° When her husband failed
to appear at a hearing to show cause why such an order should not
be granted, the court granted the order; however, there was no
record showing that the order was ever served upon Mr. Stanley.251
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Stanley and her son moved to an
apartment near the facility at which she would be working. 252 Three
days later, her husband shot his way through a sliding glass door
and threatened to kill both of them.25 She and her son tried to take
refuge in the bathroom, but he shot the locks off of that door as
well; Mrs. Stanley finally emerged from the bathroom after Mr.
Stanley promised that he would not kill her son.2M A physical
altercation occurred after Mr. Stanley announced that he was going
247. Id.
248. Id. The court also rejected Mr. Cox's contention that "the court should have
instructed, even absent request, 'that the defendant's evidence as to this right to enter the
dwelling house, if accepted by the jury, would constitute a defense to the charge of first
degree burglary.' " Id. The court flatly stated, "We find both contentions unpersuasive
because no evidence was presented that tended to show that defendant was 'on his own
premises' when he stabbed Mr. Withers [the victim's houseguest], or that tended to show that
defendant had a 'right to enter the dwelling house.' " Id.
249. Stanley v. State, 631 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
250. Stanley, 631 S.W.2d at 752.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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to kill himself and his wife; during the struggle, Mrs. Stanley was
2
shot in the thumb. 55
Frank Stanley did not dispute any of the facts regarding the
separation, the impending divorce, the separate residence, his
breaking and entering of the apartment, the fact that he planned to
kill his wife once inside, or the fact that he knew his wife did not
consent to his entry.25 Instead, he argued that because "he was
married to the person that occupied the premises he entered and
since he had not been notified of the temporary injunction
prohibiting the same, he had the right to enter into and dwell in the
257
same habitation as his spouse and to enjoy his conjugal rights."
The court summarily dismissed this defense and stated that Carolyn
Stanley "clearly had the greater right of possession and was an
'owner.' "251 In rejecting Mr. Stanley's contention that the trial court
erroneously refused to instruct the jury on his version of "effective
consent,"2 9 the court remarked that Mrs. Stanley "had the right to
refuse consent" and that there was "no implied consent to break
26
and enter merely because of the marital status." 0
The Court of Appeals of Texas for the Eighth District found the
Stanley v. State logic equally applicable to the offense of criminal
trespass when it reviewed the conviction of Bobby Pat Davis in
255. Stanley, 631 S.W.2d at 752.
256. Id. at 752-53.
257. Id. at 753. The appellate court summarized his argument as follows:
What he does argue is that one of the elements of the offense of burglary of a
habitation with intent to commit murder is that entry be made without the effective
consent of the owner. . . and that "owner" is defined as "a person who has title to
the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to
possession of the property than the actor." ... Apparently appellant would argue that
his wife could not qualify as an "owner" under the statutory definition having no
greater right of possession than he, and even if she was an "owner" there was implied
consent because of the marital status.
Id. (citations omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id. The appellant requested the following charge to the jury:
Effective consent means consent in fact, whether express or apparent, and includes
consent by a married person legally authorized to act for the owner. However, a
married person has the implied effective consent to enter upon or into the habitation
of the other spouse. To establish lack of effective consent in regard to a spouse
entering into the habitation of the other spouse, there must also be shown that there
was a lawful court order prohibiting such spouse from entering into the habitation of
the other spouse, and, that the spouse to whom the court order is directed, had
specific notice of the existence of such order.
Id. Stanley, however, provided no support for such a charge, and the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to give such a charge. Id..
260. Stanley, 631 S.W.2d at 753.
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The facts surrounding Davis's marital relationship were
similar to those in Stanley; that is, Davis and his wife separated,
his wife left the home they had shared, and rented an apartment in
her own name.2 62 While the first rental payment for the apartment
came from a joint account, subsequent payments were made from
an account Mrs. Davis opened after the separation.21 She did file
for divorce and, in this case, no restraining or protective order was
requested. M Mrs. Davis, however, did refuse to speak to her
husband on the telephone and instructed him never to enter her
265
apartment.
Mr. Davis went to the school where his wife worked and took,
without her permission, a key to her apartment that she kept in her
car.266 He waited until she was out of town and entered her
apartment "seeking evidence of his wife's cohabitation with a
boyfriend." 267 When neighbors noticed his suspicious activity, they
26
called the police, who subsequently found him hiding in a closet. 8
He was found guilty of criminal trespass and sentence to six
269
months probation and a $200.00 fine.
The Texas Penal Code provided that an individual is guilty of
criminal trespass if he "enters or remains on property or in a
building of another without effective consent and he: (1) had notice
that the entry was forbidden; or (2) received notice to depart but
failed to do so."270 The Code further stated that "notice" is defined
as "oral or written communication by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner."2 71 Davis argued on appeal
that he could not be convicted of this crime because Texas was a
community property state and, as such, he was the owner of the
272
property.
1990.261

261. Davis v. Texas, 799 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App. 1990).
262. Davis, 799 S.W.2d at 399.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 399400. In fact, he acknowledged at trial that he knew "she didn't want me
around at all and she told me not to go around the apartment." Id. at 400.
266. Id. at 399.
267. Davis, 799 S.W.2d at 399. Moreover, he parked a distance from the apartment so
as not to attract attention from his wife's neighbors. Id. at 400.
268. Id. at 399.
269. Id.
270.,

Id. at 400 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (West 1989)).

271. Id. (citing TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (West 1989)).
272. Davis, 799 S.W.2d at 400 (explaining that Texas Penal Code Ann. Section
1.07(a)(24) (West 1974) defined "owner" as "[A] person who has title to the property,
possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the
property than the actor.").
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Relying on the decision in Stanley, the court of appeals rejected
this point of error and remarked:
We find that under the circumstances of the present case, the
complainant was an owner and, as having a greater right to
possession of the premises, had the right to refuse entry to the
Appellant. The record is clear that the complainant had not
wanted to communicate with the Appellant after she had
established herself in the new residence. The prior
understandings during the first estrangement coupled with the
Appellant's surreptitious actions surrounding his entry and
discovery in the apartment are circumstances militating
27 3
against the Appellant's assertions.
The Davis court, much like the Stanley court, rejected arguments
that because the property within Mrs. Davis's apartment consisted
of joint community property, it was legally impossible for Mr. Davis
to trespass.27 4 While the appellant wanted the court to focus on the
fact that in Stanley there was a temporary restraining order against
the defendant and in his case there was not, the court pointed out
that the Stanley court "put aside the question of the temporary
injunction and chose to dwell upon the circumstances which
established the wife's ownership status."275 Consequently, the Davis
court focused on the circumstances surrounding the trespass and
the fact that the appellant conceded that he was "seeking evidence
against his wife" and found that such circumstances outweighed
contentions that Mr. Davis was entitled to enter the apartment
because some of his property was inside.276 Consequently, Bobby
277
Pat Davis's conviction for criminal trespass was affirmed.
273. Id.
274. Id at 400-01.
275. Id. at 401.
276. Id. The court also rejected Davis's assertion that the denial of his motion for a
directed verdict violated his due process rights under the Texas and United States
Constitutions. Id. Davis attempted to argue that "certain provisions of the Family Code and
the Penal Code concerning temporary restraining orders and protective orders must be
complied with in order to provide due process to a spouse who enters an estranged spouse's
residence." Id. Heavy reliance on Stanley continued as the court noted, "[that] case does not
support Appellant's contentions that various aspects of marital property law must be adhered
to prior to a prosecution under the Penal Code." Id. Likewise, the court rejected an assertion
that an interpretation of the criminal trespass statute that permitted spousal liability
"amounted to an ex post facto law" by observing that "the present statute contains explicit
language concerning the giving of notice and.., the Appellant received such notice that he
was not to enter the apartment." Id. at 402.
277. Davis, 799 S.W.2d at 402.
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Virginia
A final review of a state's handling of the issue of spousal
burglary can be found in the Virginia case of Knox v.
27 8 In this case, Billy Joe
Commonwealth.
and Shirley Knox
separated after Billy Joe physically abused Shirley. 2 9 She
2°
subsequently moved into an apartment with her children. 8
Approximately six months later, Billy Joe Knox "broke open
Shirley's front door," walked to her bedroom, and physically
assaulted his wife and her male friend.28 ' He was subsequently
28 2
sentenced to two years in prison under Virginia's burglary statute.
Knox argued on appeal that the Commonwealth was required to
show that his "right of access or consortium [had] been limited by
Court Order or Decree" to convict him of burglary.m His basis for
this argument was the common law right of consortium, and he
asserted that, "absent ... judicial restraint," this right serves as "a
limitation on a spouse's dominion and control over premises owned
and occupied by that spouse."28MThe court interpreted such an
argument as follows: "In effect, Knox argues that a husband,
although living apart from his wife, has a right, derived from his
right of access to her society and conjugal relations, to break and
enter her dwelling, even if he does so with intent to commit assault
and battery upon her person."2 85 In response, the court dryly
announced, "If ever this was the law, and we think it never was, it
is no longer."286
Rather than focusing on burglary law as support for its
conclusion, the court relied on Virginia's Married Woman's Act as
the basis for upholding Knox's conviction. 287 The court
278. 304 S.E.2d 4 (Va. 1983).
279. Knox, 304 S.E.2d at 5.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (explaining that Section 18.2-92 of the Code of Virginia Annotated, entitled
"Breaking and entering dwelling house with intent to commit assault or other misdemeanor,"
provides:
If any person breaks and enters a dwelling house while said dwelling is occupied,
either in the day or nighttime, with intent to commit assault or any other
misdemeanor except trespass, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony; provided,
however, that if such person was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of entry, he
shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony.)
283. Id.
284. Knox, 304 S.E.2d. at 5.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 5-6. The portion of the statute that the court relied on reads: "A married
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acknowledged that the Act had been interpreted to empower a
woman to "enforce her [civil] possessory rights in real property," to
sue her spouse for tortious damage to her property, to abolish the
doctrine of interspousal immunity in wrongful death suits, and,
finally, to permit a husband to be convicted for larceny of his
wife's goods.m It took little expansion to hold that the Act created
the basis for a burglary charge as the court concluded:
Summarizing and applying the principles drawn from our
decisions construing the Married Woman's Act, we are of
opinion that when a wife is living apart from her husband in
her own dwelling, one in which he has no proprietary interest,
the husband's right of consortium is subordinate to the wife's
right of exclusive possession; and, we hold that... a husband
who breaks and enters his wife's dwelling with intent to
commit assault is guilty of the crime of statutory burglary as
defined in Code Section 18.9-92.m
Thus, Billy Jo Knox's conviction for burglary was affirmed. 29°
VI.

OHIO'S OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVEMENT: A STATUTORY AMENDMENT
TO OIo

REVISED CODE SECTION

3103.04

It is apparent that the law of spousal burglary has come virtually
full circle from the days when it was legally impossible to commit
such a crime against one's spouse. In light of the Supreme Court of
Ohio's rulings in Lilly and O'Neal, one might wonder what else is
necessary to provide spouses with the same protection in their
homes that is enjoyed by unmarried individuals. I would submit the
following: the Ohio Legislature should codify its holdings in Lilly
and O'Neal through an amendment to Ohio Revised Code Section
3103.04 stating, "this section is inapplicable to criminal cases."
I offer two reasons for such an amendment. First, Ohio Revised
Code Section 2901.04 provides, in pertinent part, that "sections of
the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly
construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the
woman shall have the right to acquire, hold, use, control and dispose of property as if she
were unmarried and . . . neither her husband's right to curtesy nor his marital rights shall
entitle him to the possession or use ... of such real estate during the coverture." Id. at 5
(citing Section 55-35 of the Code of Virginia Annotated and referring to the section as "a
statutory descendant of a portion of the Married Woman's Act").
288. Id. at 5-6.
289. Knox, 304 S.E.2d at 6.
290. Id.
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accused." 291 Notwithstanding arguments about the placement of the
section among the domestic relations portions of the Code or the
fact that its history can be traced to a civil law (the Ohio Married
Women's Act), a plain reading of the statute gives absolutely no
indication that one spouse's right to the other spouse's dwelling is
vitiated in criminal law settings. The dissenting words of Justice
Harlan in Thompson v. Thompson292 actually present a very strong
argument that Section 3103.04 should serve as a defense to a
charge of burglarizing the dwelling of one's spouse. As support for
his belief that if a statutory provision, "properly construed," leads
to an unwanted result, the legislature, rather than a court, should
amend the statute, Justice Harlan wrote:
If the words used by Congress lead to such a result, and if, as
suggested that result be undesirable on grounds of public
policy, it is not within the functions of the court to ward off
the dangers feared or the evils threatened simply by a judicial
construction that will defeat the plainly-expressed will of the
legislative department. With the mere policy, expediency or
justice of legislation the courts in our system of government
have no rightful concern. Their duty is only to declare what
the law is, not what, in their judgment, it ought to be leaving the responsibility for legislation where it exclusively
belongs, that is, with the legislative department, so long as it
293
keeps within constitutional limits.
A thorough reading of Section 3103.04 of the Ohio Revised Code
would, in no way, alert an individual that he did not possess the
right to enter his spouse's dwelling. If there exists a presumption
that all citizens are presumed to know what the law is, the
holdings in Lilly and O'Neal are unfair to criminal defendants. The
statutory amendment suggested would erase all doubt about the
applicability of Section 3103.04 in criminal cases.
The second reason for the suggested amendment is grounded in
both judicial efficiency and the necessity of discarding archaic and
harmful theories about the marriage relationship. Quite frankly, it is
shameful that, in the twenty-first century, arguments supporting a
291. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04 (Anderson 2000).
292. 218 U.S, 611 (1910). In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that the common law unity, under which one spouse could not sue the other in tort because
of the theory that they were one under the law, was not abrogated by the passage of the
District of Columbia's version of a Married Women's Act. Id. at 619.
293. Id. at 621.
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spouse's right to consortium or right to society are still being made
in the context of explosive violence between married couples and
that such arguments are given consideration at the highest levels of
the judiciary.294 And yet, they will continue to be made until the law
is settled and unambiguous.
For example, Lilly focused on a burglary at a spouse's separately
leased apartment and O'Neal involved a burglary at a home leased
solely by the wife. Despite language in Lilly that "in Ohio, one can
commit a trespass and burglary against property of which one is
the legal owner if another has control or custody of that property,"
the only issue actually before the court was whether Ohio Revised
Code Section 3103.04 "precludes prosecution of one spouse for
burglary committed in the residence of the other spouse." 295 It is
not at all difficult to imagine a defense argument that those
holdings should be limited to the particular factual situations (i.e.,
separately leased dwellings) involved in Lilly and O'Neal and that
neither applies to a situation in which one spouse enters a home to
which he holds full or partial legal title and where he, for some
2 96
amount of time, resided.
294. Consider the following excerpt from Catherine F Klein and Leslye E. Orloffs
article, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statute and
Case Law:
Statutory protection of former, as well as current, spouses is a well-founded policy in
light of the Justice Department's National Crime Survey, which revealed that
seventy-five percent of all reported domestic abuse was reported by separated or
divorced women. Violence is often triggered by the anger aroused by threatened loss
and excessive feelings of dependency making the period during and after separation
an extremely dangerous time. Women who are divorced or separated are at higher
risk of assault than married women. The risk of assault is greatest when a woman
leaves or threatens to leave an abusive relationship. Nonfatal violence often escalates
once a battered woman attempts to end the relationship. Furthermore, studies in
Philadelphia and Chicago revealed that twenty-five percent of women murdered by
their male partners were separated or divorced from their assailants. Another
twenty-nine percent of women were murdered during the separation or divorce
process. State statutes need to protect women and children during and after the
break-up of relationships because of their continuing, and often heightened,
vulnerability to violence.
Catherine F Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, ProvidingLegal Protectionfor Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statute and Case Law, 21 HoFRA L REV. 801, 815-16 (1993) (footnotes
omitted).
295. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 327, 325.
296. Indeed, consider the following argument by defense counsel in the Jones case,
described at the beginning of this comment, that involved a charge of aggravated burglary at
the home formerly shared by the couple and in which the defendant retained a one-half legal
interest:
I'd like to address the cases [the prosecution] has referred to . . . if you look through
those cases.. . they talk about Lilly ... when you read [it], it talks about, and I'm quoting,
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The statutory amendment proposed herein would prevent this
and would allow any other such arguments to be disposed of well
before trial. More importantly, the amendment would expand the
protection from spousal burglary that the Lilly court so wisely
created.
Jane M. Keenan

"This case presents the Court with the question of whether Revised Code 3103.04 precludes
prosecution of one spouse for burglary conunitted in the residence of the other spouse." And
in [Lilly] there was separately, separately leased property of one spouse. The same in O'Neal
and that takes care of the . . . Supreme Court cases that they rely on. Transcript of
Proceedings for February 11, 2000, at 66-67, Jones (No. 99-CR-120) (emphasis added).

